SEARCH AND SEIZURE-NEW JERSEY
SUPREME COURT v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
John B. Wefing*
[AV]e are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual
members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement.
Chief Justice Earl Warren 1
INTRODUCTION

Although some decisions of the Warren Court actually expanded
the power of the police, 2 it has been generally recognized that the
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I Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959).
2 Various decisions of the Warren Court legitimately can be viewed as having diminished individual rights under the fourth amendment. One of the most significant
cases was Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02, 310 (1967), where the Court permitted the seizure of " 'mere evidence' " of a crime-certainly a substantial restriction of
the individual's right to be free from intrusive searches and seizures.
Prior to Warden, the prevailing rule was that a warrant could only be obtained to
search for the fruits of a crime, instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband. See Note,
Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J. 593, 606-15 (1966); 20
ALA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1967); 52 MINN. L. REV. 901, 902 (1968). Warden v. Hayden effectively changed the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent federal rule
of procedure now provides in part that
[a] warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(b) (emphasis added). The applicable New Jersey procedural rule
presently states:
A search warrant may be issued to search for and seize any property, including documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects, obtained in
violation of the penal laws of this State or any other state; or possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which has been used in connection with
any such violations; or constituting evidence of or tending to show any such
violations.
N.J.R. 3:5-2 (emphasis added). In fact, the New Jersey rules authorized the seizure of
mere evidence" roughly five years prior to the decision in Warden v. Hayden. See
N.J. REV. R. 3:2A-2 (Supp. 1967) (promulgated December 6, 1962). The Court's decision
in Warden ultimately led Justice Fortas to comment:
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Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren tipped the scales in favor
of safeguarding the rights of individuals against encroachment by governmental authority. 3 It has also been recognized that during the
I fear that in gratuitously striking down the "mere evidence" rule, which distinguished members of this Court have acknowledged as essential to enforce
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general searches, the Court today
needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of liberty's heritage.
387 U.S. at 312 (Fortas, J.,concurring).
Certain exceptions to the warrant requirement which also curbed fourth amendment
protections were recognized for the first time during the Warren years. Those exceptions include the emergency search, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(exigencies of situation permitted removal of blood from "drunk" driver to test for alcoholic content); and the stop-and-frisk weapons search, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (protective pat-down permitted even where sufficient probable cause for arrest
did not exist). The airport-search exception, while never specifically dealt with by the
Supreme Court, was permitted to flourish by the Warren Court's silence in the face of
decisions supporting this exception in virtually every jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States
v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37, 39-40
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 50-52
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672-74
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772
(4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 995 (1972); State v. Adams, 125 N.J. Super. 587, 589, 312 A.2d 642, 643 (App.
Div. 1973). As Judge Friendly has noted:
[A] consensus does seem to be emerging that an airport search is not to be
condemned as violating the Fourth Amendment simply because it does not
precisely fit into one of the previously recognized categories for dispensing
with a search warrant ....
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, although the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528,
534, 538-39 (1967), overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), and required a
warrant in an administrative search (for a housing violation), it permitted the use of a
general or area warrant for this purpose with virtually no limitations on its issuance.
This growth of exceptions may have been the natural result of an increasingly mobile
and sophisticated society; but the growth, at least in part, occurred under the Warren
Court and must be so noted.
3 See A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 74 (1968). Professor Cox observed that "[n]ever
has there been such a thorough-going reform of criminal procedure within so short a
time. Nearly all the changes benefit the accused." Id. See also Schwartz, "Warren Court"
-An

Opinion, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 48 (L. Levy ed. 1972).

Professor Schwartz noted that in the balancing process between individual and government interests,
Warren's approach . . .differed drastically from that of his predecessor. In cases
involving conflicts between government and the individual, Fred Vinson was
usually on the side of officialdom. Warren, on the other hand, start[ed] with a
strong predisposition in favor of the individual.
• . . [He was] inclined to look on claims of violation of individual rights
with a far more friendly eye.
Id. at 52.
This position seems quite tenable when viewed in light of such opinions as Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), wherein the Warren Court expanded dramatically the
rights of defendants in state prosecutions by applying the exclusionary rule to the states.
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tenure of Chief Justice Weintraub, the New Jersey supreme court diluted or abridged the fourth amendment protections which had been
extended to defendants by the United States Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Warren. 4 In contrast, the New Jersey supreme court
under Chief Justice Hughes appears to be affording greater protection to fourth amendment rights, 5 at a time when the United States
Nonetheless, other fourth amendment decisions rendered during Chief Justice Warren's
tenure indicate that the Court did not adopt a rigid policy aimed at impeding law enforcement activity. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. Rather, what developed
was a case-by-case determination of the limits of police investigatory tactics.
4 The Weintraub court's fourth amendment opinions had become so notorious that,
from the author's experience, judges and lawyers would often comment that in New
Jersey, the Bill of Rights contained one less amendment than in other jurisdictions. One
critic has noted:
The [Weintraub] court has not attached the same importance to the values expressed in the Fourth Amendment as had the makers of the constitution or the
United States Supreme Court.
Miller, Requiem for the Fourth Amendment in New Jersey, 93 N.J.L.J. 159, 159 (1970).
See also Miller, Law, Order and the Fourth Amendment, 94 N.J.L.J. 1013 (1971).
Another commentator concluded that the Weintraub court's strict construction of fourth
amendment issues stemmed from its perceptions of the prerequisities to "effective law
enforcement." Note, Judicial Federalism: Rights of the Accused in New Jersey, 23
RUTGERS L. REV. 530, 551 (1969).
5 The Hughes court trend is most apparent in the area of consent searches. See State

v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (discussed at notes 296-306 infra and accompanying text).
In addition, following Chief Justice Weintraub's departure from the court, there
appeared to be a perceptible change in philosophy in favor of protecting defendants
against unreasonable searches and seizures. For example, in In re D. S., 63 N.J. 541,
310 A.2d 460, rev'g per curiam 125 N.J. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1973), a
case decided approximately two months after Chief Justice Weintraub left the bench,
see 63 N.J. VII n.1 (1973), the court reversed the denial of a suppression motion, id. at
542, 310 A.2d at 460, which had been affirmed by the appellate division, 125 N.J.
Super. at 283, 310 A.2d at 508. In D. S., two juveniles had been observed by police
officers, at night, standing on a corner outside a tavern known to be a locus of narcotics
activity. Id. at 280-81, 310 A.2d at 507. A third apparent juvenile suddenly emerged
from the tavern and joined the other two. Id. at 280, 310 A.2d at 507. When approached
by the officers, the group " 'split up,' " and after having been summoned by the officers,
the individual who had been seen exiting the tavern answered the officers' inquiries
evasively. Id. at 281, 310 A.2d at 507. A subsequent pat-down for weapons resulted in
the discovery of narcotics, which the defendants moved to suppress. Id. at 280-81, 310
A.2d at 507.
On the basis of Judge Botter's dissent to the appellate decision, 125 N.J. Super. at
283, 310 A.2d at 508, the supreme court reversed. 63 N.J. at 542, 310 A.2d at 460. Judge
Botter had concluded that the observations of the officers justified neither an investigatory stop nor the pat-down which had yielded the contraband. 125 N.J. Super. at 283,
310 A.2d at 508. Thus, the supreme court's decision in In re D.S. to suppress is inconsistent with the pro-prosecution position nearly uniformly taken by the court under
Chief Justice Weintraub. Compare 63 N.J. at 542, 310 A.2d at 460, with State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 446-48, 303 A.2d 68, 71, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
The immediate post-Weintraub court also appeared less bound by the trial court's
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Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger is contracting fourth
amendment protections. 6 The purpose of this article is to study the
philosophical approaches of these four courts and the inevitable conflicts which have resulted from their competing views.
The fourth amendment, in establishing the right of an individual
to be free from illegal searches and seizures, to some extent renders
the discovery and prosecution of criminal activity more difficult.
Thus, the conflict between this fourth amendment right and the need
of society effectively to protect itself arises when a defendant seeks to
suppress credible evidence on the ground that it was illegally seized,
although such evidence may establish his guilt and lead to a conviction. 7
determination than had the court under Chief Justice Weintraub. Compare State v.
Flint, 64 N.J. 170, 313 A.2d 615 (1974), aff'g per curiam 126 N.J. Super. 182, 184-85,
313 A.2d 615, 616-17 (App. Div. 1973) (post-Weintraub court affirmance of a reversal of
the trial court's determination that the defendant's statement, " 'the cops are here clean
up,' " provided police officers with sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search),
and In re D. S., supra (post-Weintraub reversal of trial court finding that pat-down
search and subsequent seizure of drugs were illegal), with State v. King, 44 N.J. 346,
353-54, 358, 209 A.2d 110, 114, 116 (1965) (Weintraub court reversal of appellate decision and reinstatement of trial court finding of a legal search and seizure, indicating that
a trial court determination should not be reversed unless "clearly erroneous") (discussed
at notes 260-76 infra and accompanying text). The supreme court under Chief Justice
Weintraub rarely interfered with trial court findings, which, on the whole, tended to go
against the defendant. See p. 780 & note 29 infra.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (routine stopping
of vehicles by border patrol at permanent check point held constitutional even in the
absence of suspicion that the particular car contained illegal aliens); Stone v. Powell, 96
S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (federal habeas corpus relief held unavailable where state has provided full and fair hearing of fourth amendment claims); United States v. Miller, 96 S.
Ct. 1619 (1976) (bank depositor held not to have the requisite fourth amendment interest
in records held by bank pursuant to Bank Secrecy Act); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) (both warrantless arrest made by officers who had time to obtain warrant
and consent search conducted pursuant to that arrest held not violative of the fourth
amendment); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (refusal to retroactively apply
standards relating to warrantless border searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (demonstration of voluntariness of consent held not to require proof that
consenting individual had knowledge of right to refuse search).
Furthermore, the Burger Court had curtailed fifth amendment considerations in the
search and seizure area. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (admission of business records seized from defendant's office and containing voluntary statements of defendant held not violative of fifth amendment prohibition against selfincrimination); Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976) (a seizure, pursuant to a
valid search warrant, of an accountant's handwritten notes, from defendant's attorney,
held not violative of the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination and
found a valid search under the fourth amendment); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973) (a subpoena to appear before a grand jury for the taking of voice exemplars held
not violative of either the fourth or the fifth amendment).
7 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948). See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
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Since Mapp v. Ohio" and Ker v. California,9 state courts have
been bound to exclude evidence when fourth amendment rights, as
defined by the United States Supreme Court, have been violated.10
It thus became the duty-albeit the reluctant duty"-of the Weintraub court to employ the exclusionary rule in cases involving unreasonable searches and seizures in a manner governed by federal
standards established by the Supreme Court. 1 2 The Weintraub court
acknowledged its
clear responsibility . . . to apply [the] decisions [of the Supreme

Court] with due regard for their tenor, principles and goals in
analogous situations with the aim of determining a matter as we
conscientiously believe that Court would if the case were before
3

it. 1

Professor Amsterdam defined the competing interests in the following manner:
On the one hand is the recognition that restrictions upon means of law
enforcement handicap society's capacity to deal with two of its most deeply
disturbing problems: the fact and the fear of crime ....
On the other hand, it
was Mr. Justice Frankfurter . . . who reminded us that "[t]he history of liberty
has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards."
Id. at 354 (footnotes omitted) (quoting from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347
(1943)).
8 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See notes 42 & 44-50 infra and accompanying text.
9 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
'0 Id. at 30-34, 40-41; 367 U.S. at 655. As one commentator has observed, this had
created "a natural antagonism . . . between the Supreme Court and state courtsparticularly the states' highest appellate courts." Canon, Reactions of State Supreme
Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 109, 109
(1973). This antagonism has been exacerbated by the confusing, often contradictory,
opinions rendered by the Supreme Court in its attempt to balance the competing values
involved. This confusion has been recognized by Supreme Court members and commentators alike. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has
not . . . run smooth"); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973); Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1974). Justice Stewart recognized this
confusion when, speaking for the Court, he noted that the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment decisions could not be completely harmonized:
The decisions of the Court over the years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
11 Compare Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 510-16, 141 A.2d 46, 49-52, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958) (pre-Mapp decision where the Weintraub court explicitly
rejected exclusionary rule), with State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 589-93, 279 A.2d 675,
676-78 (1971) (post-Mapp decision where the Weintraub court "hoped" that Mapp would
not be extended). See notes 51-64 infra and accompanying text; cf. Note, supra note 4,
at 550-51.
12 See 374 U.S. at 33.
'" State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 294-95, 245 A.2d 181, 198 (1968) (Jacobs & Hall, JJ.,
dissenting), rev'd mem. and remanded sub nom. Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948
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Concession to this duty, however, failed to prevent the Weintraub
court from exercising a considerable degree of freedom in reaching
results which, if compliant with the letter of Supreme Court precedents, departed from the spirit of those opinions.14
The freedom exercised by the New Jersey supreme court in
reaching results inconsistent with the spirit of those opinions rendered by the United States Supreme Court stems in large part from
the fact that constitutional doctrine is frequently established by the
Supreme Court in cases carefully selected for their factual settings.
State courts must apply that doctrine to the facts of the case at bar.
In rendering a decision, state courts exercise discretion in interpreting Supreme Court opinions narrowly or broadly. Thus, there is
latitude to distinguish the case at bar on its facts, and it is here that
the state court's deliberation may be colored by subjective
considerations. 15 Where the state court's subjective input operates to
significantly erode a constitutionally protected right, the court invites
reversal on certiorari by the Supreme Court 16 or release of the state
prisoner on federal habeas corpus.' 7 It is evident, however, that the
specter of reversal or release of state prisoners failed to compel the
Weintraub court to conform to the liberal posture of the Warren
Court regarding fourth amendment rights.
(1971), original sentence vacated and new sentence ordered per curiam, 60 N.J. 60, 286
A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 50 N.J. 471, 474-75, 236 A.2d 577, 578 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 745
(1968).
14 The Supreme Court of New Jersey under Chief Justice Weintraub often employed the process known as "judicial erosion" to reach a decision inconsistent with a
United States Supreme Court opinion. See Note, supra note 4, at 560-65 (emphasis in

original). This process allows a court "to adhere to the letter of Supreme Court standards while ignoring their general tenor." Id. at 560 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original). It is accomplished by use of certain judicial tools, i.e., "distinguishing the
facts," or interpreting the decision in a very restricted fashion. Id. at 560-61 (emphasis
in original).
15 See Note, supra note 4, at 560-61.
16 The authority of the Supreme Court to review a final judgment of a state court of
last resort, challenged as repugnant to the Constitution, was established early. See
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414-15 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14

U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 350-51 (1816).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) affords federal habeas corpus relief from state custody
which purportedly violates the United States Constitution. Until the Court's decision in

Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), this federal remedy had been recognized to
"'exten[d] to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was ad-

mitted against them at trial." Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969); see
also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965); Benson v. California, 336 F.2d 791,
794 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965). For a discussion of the demise of
federal review of fourth amendment questions on habeas corpus see notes 91-101 infra
and accompanying text.
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The Weintraub Court
Joseph Weintraub was appointed Chief Justice of the New Jersey
supreme court in August of 1957, succeeding the late Arthur T.
Vanderbilt.' 8 During the next three years the court underwent a
major change in personnel so that by the close of 1960 only Justice
Nathan Jacobs remained from the Vanderbilt court. 19 The seven men
who constituted the Supreme Court of New Jersey in December of
1960 formed a cohesive body whose composition remained unaltered
for more than a decade. 20 The court's longevity was matched by an
amazing display of unanimity, particularly in the fourth amendment
area.
Between 1962 and 1973 the Weintraub court handed down sixty
opinions which considered the validity of various searches and seizures. 2 1 Of these decisions, fifty-eight were decided unanimously.
18 25 N.J. VII n.1 (1958); 24 N.J. VII n.1 (1957). Chief Justice Weintraub became a
member of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in November 1956, replacing William J.
Brennan, Jr., who was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. 22 N.J. VII nn.1
& 2 (1957).
19 The composition of the Vanderbilt court at the beginning of 1956 was as follows:
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., A. Dayton Oliphant,
William A. Wachenfeld, Harry Heher, Albert E. Burling, and Nathan L. Jacobs. 21 N.J.
VII (1956).
The transition from the Vanderbilt court to the Weintraub court proceeded as follows: October 16, 1956-William J. Brennan, Jr. appointed to United States Supreme
Court, 22 N.J. VII n.1 (1957). November 19, 1956-Joseph Weintraub appointed. Id.
n.2. June 16, 1957-Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt died. 24 N.J. VII n.1 (1957).
August 20, 1957-John J. Francis appointed. 25 N.J. VII n.3 (1958). August 20,
1957-Joseph Weintraub named Chief Justice. Id. n.1. October 28, 1957-A. Dayton
Oliphant retired. Id. n.2. October 28, 1957-Haydn Proctor appointed. Id. n.4. February
24, 1959-William A. Wachenfeld retired. 29 N.J. VII n.2 (1959). February 24,
1959-Frederick W. Hall appointed. Id. n.3. March 20, 1959-Harry Heher retired. Id.
n.I. March 20, 1959-C. Thomas Schettino appointed. Id. n.4. October 29, 1960-Albert
E. Burling died. 33 N.J. VII n.1 (1961). November 28, 1960-Vincent S. Haneman appointed. Id. n.2.
20 In December of 1960 the following men constituted the New Jersey supreme
court: Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, Justices Nathan L. Jacobs, John J. Francis,
Haydn Proctor, Frederick W. Hall, C. Thomas Schettino, and Vincent S. Haneman. 33
N.J. VII (1961). Justice Haneman was the first justice to leave the Weintraub court,
retiring in March 1971 to be replaced by Worrall F. Mountain. 57 N.J. VII nn.1 & 2
(1971).
21 The 60 fourth amendment cases decided between 1962 and 1973 are: State v.
Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 303 A.2d 68, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973); State v. La Porte, 62
N.J. 312, 301 A.2d 146 (1973); State v. Ebron, 61 N.J. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972); State v.
Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); State v.
Wright, 61 N.J. 146, 293 A.2d 380 (1972); State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 293 A.2d 167 (1972);
State v. Muldowney, 60 N.J. 594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d
825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972); State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849
(1972); State v. McNair, 60 N.J. 8, 285 A.2d 553 (1972); State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 285
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The first dissent, coming in a 1964 case, hinged upon the propriety of
a judge's instructions to the jury rather than the fourth amendment
issue. 22 The other dissent, written by a judge temporarily assigned to
the court, appeared in the final search and seizure case decided by
A.2d 1 (1971); State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971); State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J.
586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v. Braxton, 57 N.J. 286, 271 A.2d 713 (1970); Farley v.
$168,400.97, 55 N.J. 31, 259 A.2d 201 (1969); State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699
(1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970); State v. Carter, 54 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970), judgment vacated and new trial ordered, 69
N.J. 420, 354 A.2d 627 (1976); State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 254 A.2d 769 (1969); State v.
Morse, 54 N.J. 32, 252 A.2d 723 (1969); State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 252 A.2d 398 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1029 (1970); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969);
State v. Campbell, 53 N.J. 230, 250 A.2d 1 (1969); In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 248
A.2d 531 (1968); State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101 (1968); State v. McKnight,
52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968); State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472, 242 A.2d 322 (1968); State
v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 236 A.2d 377 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); State v.
Laws, 50 N.J. 159, 233 A.2d 633 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971 (1968); State v.
Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967); State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 231 A.2d 793 (1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968); State v. Funicello, 49 N.J. 553, 231 A.2d 579 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1968); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), suppression ordered upon remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (L. Div. 1968), remanded with request for further testimony, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969) (per
curiam), trial court suppression order aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970) (per
curiam); State v. Rudd, 49 N.J. 310, 230 A.2d 129 (1967); State v. Campisi, 49 N.J. 238,
229 A.2d 631 (1967); State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966); State v. Sheppard,
46 N.J. 526, 218 A.2d 156 (1966); State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 217 A.2d 610 (1966);
State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 216 A.2d 377 (1966); State v. Schultz, 46 N.J. 254, 216 A.2d
372, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185
(1965); State v. Daley, 45 N.J. 68, 211 A.2d 354 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022
(1966); State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 209 A.2d 829 (1965); State v. Boyd, 44 N.J. 390,
209 A.2d 134 (1965); State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 209 A.2d 124 (1965); State v.
King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110,(1965); State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 203 A.2d 23 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678 (1964);
State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964); State v. Scharfstein, 42 N.J. 354, 200
A.2d 777 (1964); State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 200 A.2d 606 (1964); State v. Kline, 42 N.J.
135, 199 A.2d 650 (1964); State v. Moriarty, 39 N.J. 502, 189 A.2d 210 (1963); State v.
Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963); State v. Zuzulock, 39 N.J. 276, 188 A.2d 403
(1963); State v. Burrachio, 39 N.J. 272, 188 A.2d 401 (1963); State v. DeGrazio, 39 N.J.
268, 188 A.2d 399 (1963); State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963); State v.
Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 183 A.2d 1 (1962); State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963).
Another search-and-seizure case was unanimously decided while Joseph Weintraub
was Chief Justice, but this decision, Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958), was written before the core of the Weintraub court had
been appointed. A number of other cases decided during the same period touched upon
fourth amendment questions, but they were not the central issues involved in the litigation. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 55 N.J. 239, 260 A.2d 849 (1970).
22 State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 102-03, 202 A.2d 678, 688-89 (1964) (Francis &
Proctor, JJ., dissenting).
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the Weintraub court.2 3 The existence of only two isolated departures
from a twelve-year record of unanimity in fourth amendment decisions serves to underscore the court's astounding unity of thought.
Chief Justice Weintraub wrote more fourth amendment decisions
than any other member of the court 24 and imprinted his fourth
25
amendment philosophy on other decisions as well.
23 State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 448-55, 303 A.2d 68, 72-75 (Conford, P.J.A.D.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973). Judge Conford, temporarily assigned to fill
a vacancy on the court, dissented on grounds that the stop and frisk in question did not
meet the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that the evidence discovered therefrom should have been suppressed under Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963). 62 N.J. at 453-54, 303 A.2d at 74-75. The Sheffield decision was announced on April 4, 1973. By that time Justices Vincent Haneman, C. Thomas Schettino, and John J. Francis had retired, see 61 N.J. VII nn.1 & 2 (1973); 57 N.J. VII n.1
(1971), and the Hughes court had begun to take shape.
The composition of the Hughes court in 1973 was as follows: March 1,
1971-Vincent S. Haneman retired. 57 N.J. VII n.1 (1971). March 15, 1971-Worrall F.
Mountain appointed. Id. n.2. September 2, 1972-John J. Francis retired. 61 N.J. VII n.1
(1973). September 9, 1972-C. Thomas Schettino retired. Id. n.2. March 22, 1973-Mark
A. Sullivan appointed. 62 N.J. VII n.1 (1973). May 23, 1973--Pierre P. Garven appointed. 63 N.J. VII n.2 (1974). June 16, 1973-Haydn Proctor retired. Id. n.3. June 17,
1973-Morris Pashman appointed. Id. n.4. August 31, 1973-Joseph Weintraub retired.
Id. n.1. September 1, 1973-Pierre P. Garven named Chief Justice. Id. n.2. September
1, 1973-Robert L. Clifford appointed. Id. n.5. October 19, 1973-Pierre P. Garven died.
Id. n.2. December 17, 1973-Richard J. Hughes appointed Chief Justice. 65 N.J. VII n.1
(1975).
24 Authors of fourth amendment decisions are: Weintraub-15; Jacobs-9; Proctor
-8;
Francis-7; Schettino-3; Hall-2; Mountain-2; Sullivan-2; Haneman-1; per
curiam-ll.
In fact, "Chief Justice Weintraub authored more majority opinions than any other
member of the New Jersey Supreme Court." Francis, Joseph Weintraub-A Judge for
All Seasons, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 186, 187 (1974).
25 Justice Weintraub was considered an intellectual giant. Judge Conford said:
It was during this period that I came to appreciate fully the dimensions of
the Weintraub legal intellect. I have never before or since met his superior. ...
I do not, of course, suggest that Weintraub was above moulding logic or
authority to fit the exigencies of the occasional tough case he took. He did it,
and well. And this skill was later evident in his judicial opinions when he
strove to justify what he thought was a desirable result with difficult precedential material.

My respect for the Chief Justice's monumental achievements in rationalizing and humanizing the law of the State and in providing years of dynamic
leadership to the greatest State court of last resort in the country is not qualified by the differences in our respective judicial philosophies. This is not the
occasion for extended discussion of them. But the Chief Justice would be the
first to agree that result-orientation is strongly characteristic of his philosophy.
It is less, of my own. Both schools have their devotees, and debate on the
subject is classic.
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A statistical analysis demonstrates that the Weintraub court decisions in the fourth amendment area weighed most heavily against the
criminal defendant. Fifty-one of the sixty opinions resulted in the
denial of a motion to suppress incriminating evidence. One case remained unresolved pending further proceedings, 26 while only eight
27
decisions ordered the suppression of illegally seized evidence.
The appellate division-, on the other hand, appeared more defendant-oriented. The supreme court reversed sixteen appellate division decisions which had ordered the suppression of evidence, 2 and
affirmed only two decisions of the appellate division which had ordered suppression. 29 In only two cases did the supreme court take a
The Chief Justice presided at conferences and arguments as the natural as
well as titular leader of a court of strong, able and independent men. He directed and controlled the mainstream of almost all oral arguments-although
the degree of control left at least one Associate Justice restive at times.
Conford,Joseph Weintraub: Reminiscences, 96 N.J.L.J. 1205, 1210 (1973).
26 State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678 (1964). The court remanded this case
for further findings regarding a search, allegedly incidental to an arrest. Id. at 101, 202
A.2d at 688. Subsequently, the trial court determined that the arrest preceded the
search, whereupon the supreme court affirmed the admission of evidence and the attendant conviction. State v. Hutchins, 44 N.J. 49, 50-51, 207 A.2d 163, 164 (1965) (per
curiam).
27 State v. Muldowney, 60 N.J. 594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972); State v. Scharfstein, 42 N.J.
354, 200 A.2d 777 (1964); State v. Kline, 42 N.J. 135, 199 A.2d 650 (1964); State v.
Moriarty, 39 N.J. 502, 189 A.2d 210 (1963); State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23
(1963); State v. Burrachio, 39 N.J. 272, 188 A.2d 401 (1963); State v. DeGrazio, 39 N.J.
268, 188 A.2d 399 (1963); State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963).
28 State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 303 A.2d 68, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973);
State v. Ebron, 61 N.J. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972); State v. Wright, 61 N.J. 146, 293 A.2d 380
(1972); State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 293 A.2d 167 (1972); State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319,
288 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. McNair, 60 N.J. 8, 285 A.2d 553 (1972); State v. Gray, 59
N.J. 563, 285 A.2d 1 (1971); State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971); State v.
Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v. Braxton, 57 N.J. 286, 271 A.2d 713
(1970); State v. Campbell, 53 N.J. 230, 250 A.2d 1 (1969); State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110,
244 A.2d 101 (1968); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967); State v. Daniels,
46 N.J. 428, 217 A.2d 610 (1966); State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 209 A.2d 829 (1965);
State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965).
29 State v. Scharfstein, 42 N.J. 354, 200 A.2d 777 (1964); State v. Kline, 42 N.J. 135,
199 A.2d 650 (1964).
The supreme court and the trial courts in New Jersey during the Weintraub tenure
appeared to have the same philosophical attitude since 48 of the 60 cases decided by
the Weintraub court affirmed the original holding of the trial court. The only trial court
decisions that were reversed by the supreme court were: State v. Muldowney, 60 N.J.
594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972); State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v.
Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101 (1968); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141
(1967); State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966); State v. Sheppard, 46 N.J. 526,
218 A.2d 156 (1966); State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 217 A.2d 610 (1966); State v. Scharfstein, 42 N.J. 354, 200 A.2d 777 (1964); State v. Kline, 42 N.J. 135, 199 A.2d 650 (1964);
State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963).
Additionally, it must be noted that 44 of the 48 cases were decided against the
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more defendant-oriented position and reverse the appellate division
in favor of the defendant. 30 In most instances, the supreme court
simply chose to bypass the appellate division and certify the cases
directly without any decision by the appellate division. 3 1 This record
has led many judges, lawyers, and defendants in New Jersey to share
in the belief that the Weintraub court vitiated fourth amendment
32
rights in New Jersey.
The Weintraub court's antagonism to the fourth amendment may
at first glance seem inconsistent with its more defendant-oriented
positions in some other areas of criminal procedure. For instance, the
Weintraub court, through its rulemaking power, gave the defendant
broad discovery rights, 33 perhaps the broadest in the country. It was
defendant. The only affirmances of trial court decisions favorable to the defendant were:
State v. Moriarty, 39 N.J. 502, 189 A.2d 210 (1963); State v. Burrachio, 39 N.J. 272, 188
A.2d 401 (1963); State v. DeGrazio, 39 N.J. 268, 188 A.2d 399 (1963); State v. Macri, 39
N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963).
30 State v. Muldowney, 60 N.J. 594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972); State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J.
410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963).
31 Twenty-nine of these fourth amendment cases were certified by the high court
before argument was heard at the appellate level. Of these 29, 12 were appeals as of
right: State v. Carter, 54 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970),
judgment vacated and new trial ordered, 69 N.J. 420, 354 A.2d 627 (1976); State v.
McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968); State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472, 242 A.2d 322
(1968); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 236 A.2d 377 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035
(1968); State v. Laws, 50 N.J. 159, 233 A.2d 633 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971
(1968); State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 231 A.2d 793 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054
(1968); State v. Funicello, 49 N.J. 553, 231 A.2d 579 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911
(1968); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967); State v. Rudd, 49 N.J. 310, 230
A.2d 129 (1967); State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 216 A.2d 377 (1966); State v. Daley, 45 N.J.
68, 211 A.2d 354 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966); State v. Bindhammer, 44
N.J. 372, 209 A.2d 124 (1965). Therefore, in 17 cases, the supreme court exercised its
discretion to bypass the appellate division. See State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d
649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969);
In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968); State v. Campisi, 49 N.J. 238, 229
A.2d 631 (1967); State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966); State v. Sheppard, 46
N.J. 526, 218 A.2d 156 (1966); State v. Schultz, 46 N.J. 254, 216 A.2d 372, cert. denied,
384 U.S. 918 (1966); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966); State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); State v. Romeo,
43 N.J. 188, 203 A.2d 23 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); State v. Moriarty, 39
N.J. 502, 189 A.2d 210 (1963); State v. Zuzulock, 39 N.J. 276, 188 A.2d 403 (1963); State
v. Burrachio, 39 N.J. 272, 188 A.2d 401 (1963); State v. DeGrazio, 39 N.J. 268, 188 A.2d
399 (1963); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 183 A.2d 1 (1962); State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481,
181 A.2d 761 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963). The implication is strong that the
court wished to avoid consideration of the fourth amendment issue by the appellate
courts.
32 See note 4 supra.

'3 See N.J.R. 3:13-3. In 1973, the New Jersey court rules were revised
in effect, to make the prosecutor's entire file available to the defendant as a
matter of the defendant's right and upon the defendant's demand, subject, of
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also one of the first courts to permit the defendant to see his presentence report prior to sentencing,3 4 and, even before the United
States Supreme Court had done so, extended the right to counsel to
indigents in disorderly persons offenses. 3 5 The court also stated that
bail should not be denied except where there was a clear indication
that the defendant would not appear at trial and rejected any theory
of preventive detention. 36 On the other hand, the Weintraub court
took a pro-prosecution stance when it gave the state the right to appeal an order for a new trial, 3 7 and when it interpreted the Supreme

course, to the State's legitimate and disclosed need for an appropriate protective order.
S. PRESSLER, CURRENT NEW JERSEY COURT RULES,

N.J.R. 3:13-3, Comment at 388

(1975). See generally Report of Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Procedure, 96
N.J.L.J. 449, 459, 462 (1973).
U State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 144, 259 A.2d 895, 903 (1969).
35Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (1971). Justice
Jacobs, writing for the New Jersey supreme court, stated:
The practicalities may necessitate the omission of a universal rule for the assignment of counsel to all indigent defendants and such omission may be tolerable in the multitude of petty municipal court cases which do not result in
actual imprisonment or in other serious consequence such as the substantial
loss of driving privileges. But, as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other
consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to
have counsel assigned without cost.
Id.
It was not until Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), that the United States
Supreme Court held:
[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.
Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
'6State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 364-65, 294 A.2d 245, 252-53 (1972).
The New Jersey court also brought plea-bargaining, which was often conducted
under the table, out into the open. See State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57 (1972),
wherein the court stated:
We now accept plea bargaining as a legitimate and respectable adjunct of
the administration of the criminal laws....
If plea bargaining is to fulfill its intended purpose, it must be conducted
fairly on both sides and the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either .... The agreement is to be placed on record in open court.
Id. at 321, 294 A.2d at 61.
37
See State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 103, 199 A.2d 630, 633-34 (1964) (order for new
trial reviewable only if collaterally attacked). The Hughes court, however, subsequently
expanded the state's right to appeal in State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 322 A.2d 809 (1974),
wherein the court "h[e]ld that the State may seek leave to appeal from any new trial
order in a criminal case." Id. at 363, 322 A.2d at 811 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Note, State May Seek Leave to Appeal All New Trial Orders Granted to a
Criminal Defendant, 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 376 (1975).
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Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona3 8 in a restrictive manner. 39
This pro-defendant-pro-prosecution dichotomy can be reconciled by reference to Chief Justice Weintraub's emphasis on getting
all credible evidence before the judge or jury and reaching a truthful
verdict. This emphasis on truth also explains Justice Weintraub's
frustration with the Warren Court's fourth amendment decisions
which interfered with the truth-finding process of the court and with
the conviction of parties whom credible evidence would likely have
established as guilty. Weintraub's search for the truth overrode any
concern regarding the methods by which the truth was attained. This
approach was nowhere more evident than in the Weintraub court's
antagonism toward the exclusionary rule, an antagonism which inevitably affected the court's determination of search and seizure legality.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a criminal trial. First alluded to in Boyd v. United States,40 applied in federal criminal cases
in Weeks v. United States, 41 and ultimately imposed on the states in
Presently, N.J.R. 2:3-1 provides the following:
In any criminal action the State may appeal or, where appropriate, seek
leave to appeal pursuant to R. 2:5-6(a):
a. to the Supreme Court from a final judgment or from an order of the
Appellate Division, pursuant to R. 2:2-2(b) or 2:2-3;
b. to the appropriate appellate court from: (1) a judgment of the trial court
entered before or after trial dismissing an indictment, accusation or complaint;
(2) an order of the trial court entered before trial in accordance with R. 3:5
(search warrants); (3) a judgment of acquittal entered in accordance with R.
3:18-2 (judgment n.o.v.); (4) a judgment in a post-conviction proceeding collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence; (5) an interlocutory order entered before or after trial.
38 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39 See, e.g., State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366, 376-77, 283 A.2d 321, 326-27 (1971); State
v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52-56, 243 A.2d 240, 250-52 (1968).
40 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). In Boyd, Justice Bradley spoke of the fourth amendment
as protecting one's "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where . . . [not] forfeited by . . . conviction," and stated that "forcible and

compulsory extortion of . . . private papers to be used as evidence" against a person
would be condemned under the fourth and fifth amendments. Id.
41 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks involved a warrantless seizure of letters and lottery
tickets later used as evidence in a criminal trial. Petitioner claimed that this use of
illegally seized evidence violated his rights under the fourth and fifth amendments. Id.
at 388-89. The Court limited its opinion to the fourth amendment, which it perceived as
a limitation on the power of federal officials, and it stated that if evidence obtained by a
warrantless seizure could be
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Mapp v. Ohio,4 2 this rule has been the source of great confusion and
the subject of heated controversy. 43 The purpose of this section,
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment . . . [would be] of no value, and . . . might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 389, 391-92, 393. The Weeks Court also stated that for the court
[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
Id. at 394. Hence the Court held that refusal to return evidence illegally seized by
federal officials violated the petitioner's constitutional right and that its introduction at
trial was prejudicial error. Id. at 398. The Court expressly exempted evidence seized by
state policemen, stating that the limitations imposed by the fourth amendment reached
only "the Federal Government and its agencies." Id.
42 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
367 U.S. at 665. Wolf had held that although the fourth amendment was applicable to
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 338 U.S. at 27-28,
the fourteenth amendment did not prohibit the introduction of illegally seized evidence
in a state prosecution. Id. at 33. In Wolf, the Court termed the Weeks decision "a matter
of judicial implication," id. at 28, and the exclusionary rule "a remedy" which was "less
compelling" at the state and at the federal level. Id. at 30-32. Hence, the Wolf Court
concluded that even though exclusion may act. to deter, the Court could not deem unconstitutional "a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced,
would be equally effective." Id. at 31.
43 Confusion and controversy abound in commentary on the exclusionary rule. At
issue are the purposes of the rule, whether the exclusion of illegally seized evidence at
trial is or is not constitutionally required, whether the exclusionary rule operates to
deter fourth amendment violations, and ultimately, whether the exclusionary rule
should be retained, expanded, limited, or totally abandoned. For a contrast in the
rationale for and constitutional status of the rule see Schrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV.
251, 372 (1974) (defendant has a personal constitutional right to exclusion of illegally
seized evidence under both the fourth amendment and the due process clause); Burns,
Mapp v. Ohio, An All American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 80, 100 (1969) (application
of exclusionary rule to states is an attempt to create federal common law of search and
seizure and is unauthorized by Constitution); Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation
and Parole Revocation: Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Imperative of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 21, 26 (1975) ("neither the deterrence rationale
nor the 'imperative of judicial integrity' necessarily requires exclusion of all unconstitutionally obtained evidence"). There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the exclusionary rule effectively has deterred illegal police conduct. Compare Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 755-56 (1970) (exclusionary rule fails to deter and should be abolished on condition that viable substitute
is adopted); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243, 248 (1973) (data indicates exclusionary
rule fails to deter) and Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?,
50 TEXAS L. REV. 736, 743-45 (1972) (exclusionary rule has no significant deterrent
effect and should be restricted to instances of "outrageous" police conduct), with Canon,
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a
Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 725-26 (1974) (empirical evidence does not
warrant conclusion that exclusionary rule fails to deter); Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule
and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 856, 879 (1974) (lack of deterrence value

1976]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

however, is not to explore the confusion or participate in the controversy. Rather, this section will examine and compare the views
held by the Weintraub, Warren, Hughes, and Burger courts and
analyze how each court has defined and weighed the competing interests involved.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp, which applied the exclusionary rule to the states, sought to achieve the following: deterrence of improper police activity, 4 4 preservation of the integrity of the judiciary, 4 5 and protection of the individual's "personal"
right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. 46 The Court's
premise was that the exclusionary rule was a "constitutionally reunproven and if lack exists, it results from failure of judiciary to enforce the exclusionary
rule) and Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary
Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L.
REV. 740, 763, 776 (1974) (research fails to show exclusionary rule ineffective). See also
Cleary, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 1 NAT'L J. CliM. DEF.
21, 22, 28 (1975) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to insulate court from participation in
unconstitutional acts by law officers and is needed as "an efficient tool to insure integrity"); Wilkes, A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The Historical Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 900-01 (1975)
(exclusionary rule is necessary today due to "widespread police corruption and abuse of
power"); Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1129, 1163-64 (1973) (apart
from deterrence, judicial integrity mandates expansion of exclusionary rule beyond trial
setting).
For a concise analysis of the current status of the exclusionary rule and alternate
remedies for fourth amendment violations including the Federal Tort Claims Act see
Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act-An Alternative To The Exclusionary Rule?, 66
J. CRIM. L. & C. 1 (1975).
44 367 U.S. at 656. The Court viewed exclusion of illegally seized evidence as the
only effective way to enforce fourth amendment rights:
[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it."
Id. (quoting from Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
45367 U.S. at 659 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
46See 367 U.S. at 655-56.
While the majority in Mapp did not state expressly that there is a personal fourth
amendment right to exclusion of illegally seized evidence at trial, this assumption
seems implicit in the opinion. For instance, the Court stated that "exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give" in violation of the fourth amendment was essential to the basic constitutional right to privacy and "its most important
constitutional privilege." Id. at 656 (emphasis added). The Court cited Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), which speaks in terms of a man's "indefeasible right of
personal security," see 367 U.S. at 647; referred to a "jealous regard for maintaining
integrity of individual rights," id.; and cited Weeks for the proposition that if illegally
seized evidence is used against a defendant at trial, " 'his right to be secure ...is of no
value' " and such use constitutes " 'a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused,"' id. at 648 (quoting from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398
(1914)). See also Critique, supra note 43, at 787 & n.183.
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quired--even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard"4 7 and an
"essential ingredient" of the fourth amendment as applied
to the
states.48 In answer to criticism that the exclusionary rule operated to
free the guilty, the Mapp Court invoked the "clean-hands-judicial
integrity" rationale of Justice Brandeis, which mandated the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence on the grounds that otherwise the court
would be condoning governmental wrongdoing, and thus breeding
contempt for the law and, ultimately, anarchy. 4 9 The Court also
termed the exclusion of illegally seized evidence the fourth
' 50
amendment's foremost "privilege. "
In contrast, the Weintraub court believed that the right of society to be protected against criminal acts took precedence over the
right of the individual to be protected against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 5 1 Hence, prior to Mapp, the court had refused to impose the exclusionary rule in state criminal cases5 2 and, after Mapp,
5
continued to criticize the rule vehemently. 3
In its initial rejection of the exclusionary rule in Eleuteri v.
Richman, 4 the Weintraub court balanced the justifications it per47 367 U.S. at 648. The Mapp Court first cited Boyd and Weeks for the proposition
that use of illegally seized evidence violated the defendant's constitutional rights, and
concluded that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated because without it,
the fourth amendment guarantees were meaningless. Id. at 646--48, 655.
48 Id. at 655-56. The Court reasoned that just as the exclusionary rule was deemed
essential to the fourth amendment right of privacy in federal cases, so was it essential to
the due process right to fourth amendment protections recognized in Wolf. Id.
49 Id. at 659 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting)).
Justice Brandeis' rationale in Olmstead was that by attempting to use illegally
seized evidence, the Government itself became a law breaker and, as such, came to
Court with "unclean hands." 277 U.S. at 483-84.
w 367 U.S. at 656. See also note 46 supra.
51 As explained by Chief Justice Weintraub,
[slince the Fourth Amendment speaks, not in terms that are absolute, but
rather of unreasonableness, it necessarily calls for a continuing reconciliation of
competing values. Pre-eminent in the galaxy of values is the right of the individual to live free from criminal attack in his home, his work, and the streets.
State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 22, 231 A.2d 793, 796 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054
(1968). A second omnipresent consideration which militated against recognition of
fourth amendment rights vis-h-vis exclusion was that the effect of exclusion was to suppress "evidence of unimpeachable probative worth . . . with the obvious hurt to other
individuals and to public values involved." State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 81, 232 A.2d
141, 145 (1967).
52 Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 516, 141 A.2d 46, 51-52, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
843 (1958).
5 See, e.g., State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 590-92, 279 A.2d 675, 677-78 (1971); State
v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 81, 232 A.2d 141, 145 (1967).
54 26 N.J. 506, 516, 141 A.2d 46, 51-52, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958).
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ceived for the rule-deterring fourth amendment violations by the
police and preserving the court's integrity-against the penalty paid
by society-allowing the guilty to go free and inflicting confusing and
unworkable standards on law enforcement personnel. 55 The court
concluded that, unlike the extortion of confessions, illegal searches
and seizures may result from good-faith mistakes by police and that a
blanket exclusion of all illegally seized evidence was an overbroad
sanction which could "only be [justified] on the uncertain ground that
anything less would be inadequate." 56 Chief Justice Weintraub emphasized the differences between the state and federal criminal justice systems, implying that while the exclusionary rule might be appropriate in the federal system, it was inappropriate in a state system
57
which had to deal with a far greater incidence of crime.
Ten years of laboring under the Mapp rule served only to increase Chief Justice Weintraub's frustration. In State v. Bisaccia,58 he
took the position that it was "quite doubtful" that the exclusionary
rule had fulfilled its deterrent purpose; 59 and that, even if it did curtail police misconduct, the price paid by society was too great: The
innocent were "denie[d] . . . the protection due them";6 0 "release
61
of the guilty [undermined] the deterrent thrust of the criminal law";
and law enforcement officers were hampered due to the myriad confusing decisions by which they were to regulate their conduct. 62 He
gave short shrift to the judicial-integrity rationale cited in Mapp,
stating that freeing patently guilty persons itself "debases the judicial
process."63 The Chief Justice stated that the purpose of the exclusion-

55 See 26 N.J. at 512-13, 141 A.2d at 49-50.
56

Id. at 514-15, 141 A.2d at 51.

57 Id. at 512, 141 A.2d at 50.

58 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971). The unanimous opinion in Bisaccia reflected
Chief Justice Weintraub's animosity towards the exclusionary rule. See id. at 593, 279
A.2d at 678. The facts of the case were appropriate for an attack on the exclusionary
rule, since the appellate division had suppressed evidence on a highly technical basis,
i.e., the suppression motion was based "upon the fact that the correct number of the
building was 375, rather than 371 [even though] the building was unmistakably described in the affidavit." Id. at 588, 279 A.2d at 676.
59 Id. at 589-90, 279 A.2d at 677.
60 Id. at 590, 279 A.2d at 677. Chief Justice Weintraub pointed out that
[w]hen the truth is suppressed and the criminal is set free, the pain of suppression is felt, not by the inanimate State or by some penitent policeman, but by
the offender's next victims for whose protection we hold office.
Id.
61 Id.
62

Id.

63

See id. at 589, 279 A.2d at 676.
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ary rule was to deter "insolence in office" and questioned the efficacy
64
of its application where intentional police misconduct was absent.
Hence, while the Warren Court spoke of an individual's fourth
amendment right and privilege, the Weintraub court spoke of the
innocent public's right to protection against criminal acts. While
Mapp expounded the constitutional necessity of exclusion as a deterrent, Bisaccia declared that the rule did not deter, but that even if it
did, deterrence still could not justify freeing the guilty. While Mapp
spoke of maintaining judicial integrity by not admitting evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, Bisaccia spoke of the
harm done to judicial integrity by rendering false acquittals.
With the succession of Nixon appointees to the Court, 65 however, Supreme Court statements concerning the exclusionary rule
have come to parallel many of those expressed by Chief Justice Weintraub. The Burger Court has rejected the existence of any fourth
amendment personal right or "privilege" to have illegally seized evi-

- Id. at 591-92, 279 A.2d at 677-78. Chief Justice. Weintraub was neither the first
nor the last to advise limiting the exclusionary rule to those instances where official
misconduct is patent or egregious. The idea was expressed in Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo's oft-cited opinion in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585,
587, 588-89, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926), which has been credited by some with
having substantially undermined the normative or judicial-integrity rationale of Weeks,
a result evidenced by the attempts of subsequent courts to find an independent empirical deterrent value to justify the exclusionary rule. See Gibbons, Practical Prophylaxis and Appellate Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as a Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 295, 302-03 (1972).
The idea that the exclusionary rule should not be abolished but should be confined
to situations in which police conduct was egregious has also been expounded by
Charles Allen Wright. See Wright, supra note 43, at 743-45. The rationale for this view
is that the fourth amendment purpose is to protect people against "unreasonable"
search and seizures and that the "unreasonable" conduct sought to be avoided is official
arrogance and abuse of power. Since the exclusionary rule is drastic, in that it excludes
perfectly credible evidence and often results in acquitting guilty parties, whatever deterrent value it has should be aimed solely at those egregious offenses the fourth
amendment was designed to prevent. See, e.g., State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 591, 279
A.2d 675, 677 (1971); Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 514-15, 141 A.2d 46, 51, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958); Wright, supra note 742-45.
65 When Mapp was decided in 1961, the members of the Supreme Court were Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, Tom
Clark, John Harlan, William Brennan, Charles Whittaker, and Potter Stewart, 368 U.S.
III (1961). In 1972, the Court was composed of Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justices
William Douglas, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall,
Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. 409 U.S. in (1972). Justice
Douglas retired in 1975 and was replaced by John Paul Stevens, who was appointed by
President Ford. 96 S. Ct. No. 6 11 & nn.1 & 2 (1976). of the current Court, four are
Nixon appointees: Chief Justice Burger, appointed in 1969, 395 U.S. xv (1969); Justice
Blackmun, appointed in 1970, 398 U.S. iv n.1 (1970); and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, appointed in 1971, 404 U.S. iv nn.1 & 2 (1971).
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dence excluded at trial and has discounted the judicial-integrity
rationale for the exclusionary rule. 66 Hence, a decision involving the
applicability of the exclusionary rule is reduced to weighing the deterrent value of the rule in that particular situation against the competing values of efficient administration of justice and protection of
society.6 7 By isolating and emphasizing the deterrence rationale for
the exclusionary rule, the Court has been able to limit the scope of
the rule on grounds that the deterrence factor either is not
implicated 6 8 or is lacking in sufficient merit to override law enforcement considerations. 6 9 This rationale has resulted in a narrowing both
of the scope of the Mapp rule and of federal habeas jurisdiction to
consider fourth amendment violations.
Dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 70 Chief Justice

Burger leveled a strong attack against the exclusionary rule, stating
that the only real purpose of the rule was deterrence. 7 1 He termed
the rule "conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective." 72 Although he advised retaining the rule
until it was replaced by another effective substitute, 73 he counseled
the court "to re-examine [its] scope . . . and consider at least some
66 See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047-48 (1976) (discussed in notes 91-100
infra and accompanying text).
67 See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3048-50 (1976). The first Burger decision
to reflect this approach was United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-49 (1974) (discussed in notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text). For a discussion of the case and the
ways it departed from prior case law see Critique, supra note 43, at 779-90.
68 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39, 542 (1975) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 82-90 infra).
69 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 351-52 (1974) (discussed in
notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text).
70 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Bivens, the Court held that
alleged violations of the fourth amendment stated a federal cause of action for which
recovery of damages would be an appropriate remedy. Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
71 Id. at 413-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice mentioned "varying
alternative justifications" for the rule but discounted them. Id: at 413-14. First, he
stated that judicial integrity would "not require adherence to the exclusionary rule" if
another "effective remedy" existed. Id. at 414. Secondly, he discounted the Boyd
rationale which premised exclusion on the relationship between the fourth amendment
and fifth amendment, stating "that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not protect a person from the seizure of evidence that is incriminating." Id.
72 Id. at 415. Many of the points made by Chief Justice Burger echo those of the
Weintraub court, specifically, the failure of the rule to deter, the high price paid by
society when guilty parties are released, and the mechanical application of the rule
despite the wide divergence in the degree of error on the part of the police. Compare
id. at 418-20 with 58 N.J. at 589-92, 279 A.2d at 677-78.
73 403 U.S. at 420. The Chief Justice admitted the ineffectiveness of private damage
actions and proposed that Congress provide an exclusive statutory remedy similar to the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 421-23.
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74
narrowing of its thrust."

Subsequently, in United States v. Calandra,75 the Court refused
to apply the exclusionary rule to a grand jury proceeding.76 Speaking
for a six-to-three majority, Justice Powell rejected the existence of
any personal fourth amendment right or "privilege" to exclude illegally seized evidence 7 7 and ignored the judicial-integrity rationale,

78

79
thus isolating deterrence as the exclusionary rule's only justification.
Reasoning that "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain
at best," 80 Justice Powell concluded that the Court must

decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and
undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand
jury. 81
Following Calandra, the Court in United States v. Peltiers2 again
refused to extend the exclusionary rule. In Peltier, the defendant
challenged a warrantless auto search conducted "by a roving border

patrol."83 The Court held that the search was illegal under the stand84
ards for border searches set out in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
14Id. at 424. More recently, the Chief Justice has discarded the need for a substitute and called for the complete abandonment of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v.
Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3054-55 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
75414 U.S. 338 (1974).
76 Id. at 342.
77 Id. at 348. Justice Powell termed the exclusionary rule
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78 This omission formed the basis of Justice Brennan's dissent. See id. at 355-67
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan called the Court's failure to acknowledge the
judicial-integrity rationale a "downgrading of the exclusionary rule," id. at 356, which
disregarded the historical rational for the rule and
discount[ed] to the point of extinction the vital function of the rule to insure
that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal
government conduct.
Id. at 360.
79Id. at 347-48.
80 Id. at 351.
8 Id. at 351-52 (footnote omitted).
82 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
83 Id. at 532, 539-40.
84 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, the Court refused to extend the border
search exception, holding that "[iln the absence of probable cause or consent," a warrantless automobile search carried out 25 air miles inside the border was violative of the
fourth amendment. Id. at 268, 273.
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but refused to apply those standards retroactively. 85 In affirming
the conviction based upon evidence seized in the search, 8 6 the
Court reasoned that because Almeida-Sanchez was decided after the
search in Peltier had taken place, the police could not have known
that their conduct in making the search was violative of the fourth
amendment.8 7 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Peltier,
affirmatively stated that
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed
only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search
88
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Rehnquist added that when police seize evidence in the goodfaith belief that it would be admissible, "the 'imperative of judicial
integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that
material." 89 Justice Brennan dissented, terming the majority decision

a departure from prior law and one based "upon an entirely new
understanding of the exclusionary rule," which he feared signalled
"the complete demise of the exclusionary rule. '"90
The Burger Court's antipathy to the exclusionary rule has also
resulted in a drastic narrowing of federal collateral review of fourth
amendment claims. In Stone v. Powell,91 the Court limited federal

habeas corpus review of state search and seizure decisions to those
instances where a defendant has been denied full and fair litigation
of his fourth amendment claim by the state. 92 The Court's decision in
422 U.S. at 534-35.
See id. at 532, 542.
87 Id. at 540-42. The Almeida-Sanchez case was decided four months after the
search of Peltier had occurred. Id. at 532.
88 Id. at 542.
89 Id. at 537. Thus, unlike Justice Powell in Calandra,see text accompanying notes
85

86

77-78 supra, Justice Rehnquist recognized judicial integrity as a consideration, but
concluded that it is not implicated in the absence of a knowing violation by law enforcement personnel. See 422 U.S. at 537-38.
90 422 U.S. at 550-51.
91 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). Both Stone v. Powell and its companion case, Wolff v. Rice,
involved defendants convicted of murder in state courts who obtained writs of habeas
corpus from federal courts on grounds that evidence introduced at trial had been illegally seized. See id. at 3039-40, 3042.
92 Id. at 3045-46, 3052. Fourth amendment claims had been cognizable on federal
habeas corpus since Mapp t. Ohio. See note 17 supra. Following Mapp, the Warren
Court, in a series of decisions, expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain
habeas petitions from state defendants. The most important such decision was Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), in which the Court held that habeas relief would not be
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Stone was not unexpected. The rationale for such a position had already been announced by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,9 3 and it was this opinion which formed
the basis for the states' arguments in Stone. 94 In Schneckloth and
again in Stone, Justice Powell asserted that the only basis for granting
barred by the failure of a state defendant to comply with state procedural requirements,
id. at 398-99, and that
the doctrine under which [such] defaults are held to constitute an adequate
and independent state . . . ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not
to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal
habeas statute.
Id. at 399. The Court also held that a federal judge could exercise discretion and refuse
jurisdiction only where the defendant had "deliberately by-passed" the state procedure,
id. at 438, which would occur when
a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate
his federal claims in the state courts ....
Id. at 439.
The Warren Court also expanded federal habeas jurisdiction through broadening
the category of individuals entitled to file petitions. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 237-38 (1968) (unconditional release does not moot proceeding on habeas corpus
when petitioner applied for writ while still in jail); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
236, 243 (1963) (state parolee is in " 'custody' " within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and
can challenge validity of his conviction in federal court on writ of habeas corpus).
During the period from 1960 to 1970, the increase in the number of state prisoners
filing for federal habeas corpus increased dramatically. The 9,063 petitions filed by state
prisoners in 1970 reflected a 1,254.6 per cent increase over the number filed in 1960,
according to the 1970 report issued by the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1510 & n.3 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin,

D. Shapiro & H.

Wechsler 1973). However, statistics for 1971 indicated a decline in the number of state
prisoners seeking federal collateral review, from 9,063 to 8,372. Id. at 1510-11 n.5.
Just as the Burger Court is moving to contract the scope of the exclusionary rule,
see notes 75-90 supra and accompanying text; cf. notes 70-74 supra and accompanying
text, it has also moved to contract the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction. The most
significant case for fourth amendment purposes is, of course, Stone v. Powell. However,
prior to Stone, in Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976), the Court held that
failure to object to the composition of a grand jury as required by a state procedural rule
precluded the availability of federal review on a writ of habeas. Id. at 1709, 1711. In
Estelle v. Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976), the Court held that defendant's silence during
trial constituted a waiver of his right not to be tried wearing prison dress, notwithstanding the fact that he had earlier requested a change of clothes from the jail attendant. Id.
at 1695-97. Justice Brennan considered the effect of the two cases to undermine substantially, if not to overrule sub silentio, the holding of Fay v. Noia. See 96 S. Ct at
1703-04, 1713-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. Id. Justice Blackmun stated that he essentially agreed with Justice
Powell but felt the question of review of fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus
had not been presented. Id. at 249 (Blackmun, J., concurring) & n.38 (majority opinion).
94 See Arguments Before the Court, 44 U.S.L.W. 3485, 3485-86 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976).
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federal habeas relief is "unjust incarceration," 95 the determination of
which involves the credibility of evidence admitted and the innocence
of the convicted party.9 6 Since neither lack of credibility nor guilt are
questioned in fourth amendment claims 9 7 and since "the deterrent
function of the exclusionary rule is least efficacious" in a collateral review setting, 9 8 federal review of fourth amendment claims should be
limited to whether the petitioner received a fair hearing in the state
courts. 99 Hence,
where the State has provided an opportunity for [such a hearing],
a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial. 100

In withdrawing federal collateral review of fourth amendment
claims, the Supreme Court, in effect, is vindicating the Weintraub
court's position both on the exclusionary rule and on the need for
greater flexibility and control on the part of the state in the administration of its criminal justice system. 101
During the tenure of Chief Justice Weintraub, the New Jersey
court managed to avoid the impact of the exclusionary rule and to impose its own view favoring protection of society over protection of individual fourth amendment rights. It accomplished this by interpreting the searches and seizures as complying with the letter, if not the
95 412 U.S. at 257-58 (emphasis in original); see 96 S. Ct. at 3050 n.31.
96 412 U.S. at 256-58; 96 S. Ct. at 3050 n.31.
97 412 U.S. at 258; see 96 S. Ct. 3049-50.
98 412 U.S. at 269-70; see 96 S. Ct. at 3051 & nn.32 & 34.
99 412 U.S. at 266; cf. 96 S. Ct. at 3052.
o096 S. Ct. at 3052 (footnotes omitted).
101See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 70, 286 A.2d 55, 60 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 590-91, 279 A.2d
675, 677 (1971); Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 512, 141 A.2d 46, 50, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 843 (1958). Chief Justice Weintraub's strongest statement regarding his frustration
with the standards imposed by the Warren Court appeared in Funicello, where he
stated:
Among the first demands upon the State is the protection of the citizen from
criminal attack in his home, in his work, and in the streets. The citizen looks to
the State judiciary for fair and effective prosecution of violators of the criminal
law. Yet, although the State Supreme Court is thus charged with the responsibility for that result, its power to lay down the rules has been shifted to the
Federal Supreme Court by a run of its decisions over the past 12 years or so.
Those decisions were not at all compelled by "my copy" of the Constitution or
its history. Surely the Federal Supreme Court would not have been derelict if it
had left the final power where it had reposed for almost 200 years.
60 N.J. at 70, 286 A.2d at 60 (concurring opinion).
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spirit, of the Warren Court decisions. This is evidenced, in varying
degrees, in the following areas: probable cause, minimization, searches
incidental to arrest, and consents to search.
PROBABLE CAUSE

The fourth amendment's search warrant requirement-subject
to a few "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptionsI 0 2-dictates that
a search will be constitutionally legitimate only if preceded by a determination that probable cause exists to believe that evidence of a
crime will be found. 10 3 However, because the question of probable
cause arises in myriad factual circumstances, a precise working definition of the term has not been set forth. Thus, magistrates and judges
have been forced to develop a "sense" of what is necessary to establish
102 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Some types of searches recognized as permissible without the need of prior judicial approval are consent searches,
see, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), "plain view" searches, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), searches incidental to lawful arrest, see e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969), border searches, see, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973), "open field" searches, see, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), and
regulatory searches, see, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
103 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964).
The New Jersey supreme court recognized the constitutional requirement of a finding of probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant. In State v. Macri, 39 N.J.
250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963), Justice Jacobs noted:
Our recent Rules Governing Search Warrants do not embody the federal rules
and decisions in every respect. . . . They do, however, expressly recognize, as
they must, the constitutional need for a verified showing of probable cause
before the issuing magistrate; and they implicitly acknowledge the basic requirement, which the federal cases have repeatedly asserted, that the showing
be not merely of belief or suspicion, but of underlying facts or circumstances
which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the law was being violated.
Id. at 260, 188 A.2d at 394-95 (emphasis added) (citation & footnote omitted).
The warrant must be issued by a neutral third party. Thus, in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a local prosecutor
lacked the requisite impartiality to issue a warrant. It is also clear that the issuing person need not be a judge or a lawyer. In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345,
351-54 (1972), the Burger Court approved an ordinance permitting a municipal court
clerk to issue an arrest warrant. Presumably, the Court also would have approved of a
search incident to the arrest pursuant to such a warrant-a result which had been
reached by the Weintraub court five years earlier. See State v. Ruotolo, 52 N.J. 508,
510-12, 515, 247 A.2d 1, 2-3, 5 (1968). Other state courts had rejected the right of a
clerk to issue arrest warrants. See, e.g., State v. Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 141, 150-51, 151
N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (1967).
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probable cause- 0 4 -an endeavor which necessarily must foster judicial inconsistency in the interpretation and application of the term
"probable." This is not to say, however, that no guidelines exist.
The
Supreme Court has formulated some fundamental criteria with which
10 5
to test the existence of probable cause. In Brinegarv. United States,
the Court fashioned the following description:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within
• . . [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been
10 6
or is being committed.
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that something more than
mere suspicion or belief must be shown to establish probable cause.
As the Brinegar Court noted, "[i]n dealing with probable cause, . . .
as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.- 10 7 Thus, the
standard has become "probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity."' 10 8
Similarly, because of the ex parte nature of the warrant application hearing, and since the quantum of proof necessary to show probable cause is considerably less than that required to establish the guilt
of a defendant, formal rules of evidence are not strictly observed,
thereby permitting "a finding of 'probable cause' [to] rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial."' 1 9 Thus,
the judge or magistrate may entertain and rely on hearsay presented
in the affidavit by the affiant "so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay" can be found. 1 10
Frequently, the relationship between hearsay and probable
cause surfaces where a law enforcement officer attempts to secure a
search warrant by presenting information received from an unnamed
informant. The Warren Court, in Aguilar v. Texas"' and Spinelli v.

104See Berner, Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology, 8 VALPARAISO U.L.
REV. 471, 493-95 (1974).
105338 U.S. 160 (1949).
0 6
'
Id. at 175-76 (quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
107

338 U.S. at 175.

108 Spinelli

v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). See also Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73
(1949).
109 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965). See also McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967).
110Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960).
11 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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United States, 1 12 established a rigid doctrine concerning the use of
an informant's tip. In Aguilar, the Court implemented a "two-pronged
test" which, if satisfied, would permit a finding of probable cause.
The Court determined that, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant, the judicial officer must be apprised "of some of the underlying
circumstances" (1) leading the informant to conclude that criminal
activity was being carried on and (2) from which the affiant reached
the conclusion "that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his informa-

tion 'reliable.'

"113

Subsequently, in Spinelli, the Warren Court acknowledged
that an informant's tip initially must be examined in light of the Aguilar requirements-that is, a tip must be shown to be reliable and must
provide a sufficiently detailed description of the criminal activity so
"that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more
substantial than a casual rumor. "114 However, the Court also recognized that a tip which failed to meet the Aguilar test could still establish probable cause if the information supplied was sufficiently
corroborated by independent police investigation. 1 5 In reaching this
112

393 U.S. 410 (1969).

113 378 U.S. at 114 (citations & footnote omitted). The affidavit presented in Aguilar

recited:
"Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic
paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of
sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."
Id. at 109. Since the affidavit did not reveal to the judicial officer the circumstances
under which the informer concluded that narcotics were located at the premises, the
first prong of the test was not satisfied. The Court concluded that the magistrate could
not, based on the conclusory allegations presented, have made " 'a neutral and
detached' " determination of probable cause. Id. at 115 (quoting from Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). Thus, the Court ordered the seized evidence suppressed.
378 U.S. at 115-16. The Court, therefore, did not reach the second-prong issue of the
informer's reliability.
114 393 U.S. at 415-16. The Court noted that the degree of detail provided by an
informer in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), was an appropriate standard.
393 U.S. at 416. The issue presented to the Draper Court was whether probable cause
for a warrantless arrest could be based on hearsay. 358 U.S. at 310-11. The informer had
tipped the Bureau of Narcotics that Draper had violated the narcotics laws and would
arrive from Chicago at the Denver railroad station in possession of a quantity of heroin.
Additionally, the informer supplied a detailed description of Draper, including his physical characteristics, the clothing he would be wearing, the luggage he would be carrying, and the pace of his walk. Id. at 309. When a male matching this exact description
alighted from a train which had departed from Chicago, he was immediately arrested.
The ensuing search incidental to the arrest uncovered heroin. Id. at 309-10. The Spinelli Court concluded that "[a] magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." 393 U.S.
at 417 (footnote omitted).
115 393 U.S. at 415-17.
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conclusion, the Spinelli Court rejected a " 'totality of circumstances'
approach" in a determination of probable cause as one which "paints
with too broad a brush" but determined that the use of other detailed
or corroborative information did not offend the analysis dictated by
Aguilar.116 In examining the affidavit in question, the Spinelli majority determined that the allegation regarding the defendant's criminal
reputation was "but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion
that [was] entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision. '"117 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the corroborative
data presented were inadequate to establish probable cause.118
The Supreme Court of New Jersey under Chief Justice Weintraub, in a series of cases dealing with informers, placed fewer restrictions on the use of informers than did the Warren Court and unquestionably advanced many of the fourth amendment policies which
have been recently enunciated by the Burger Court. Because of the
difficulty in defining probable cause, the court was able to reach the
desired outcome-admitting the evidence-without necessitating the
outright rejection of any United States Supreme Court opinion. As
one commentator has noted:
People tend to shade how "probable" is "probable enough" in accordance with the consequences both good and bad which are to
follow from the determination. . . . Thus "probable cause" is ultimately referable to the competition of the individual's interest
in being free of intrusion and society's interest in law enforcement
and crime prevention, a competition which forms the basis for the
entire fourth amendment field."l 9
The premium which Chief Justice Weintraub placed on the protection of the individual against criminal attack, when combined with
his abhorrence of freeing convicted felons by exclusion of credible
evidence,1 2 0 led him to find probable cause in questionable situations,
thereby effectively circumventing the dictates of the exclusionary
rule.
116 Id. at 415.
117 Id. at 414.
11l Id.
at 418-19. The Spinelli affidavit was "more ample than that in Aguilar." Id.
at 413. It recited that (1) a confidential, reliable informer had revealed that Spinelli was
engaged in bookmaking via two telephones in a particular apartment, (2) the two telephones in the apartment had numbers which corresponded to the numbers given by the
informer, (3) the suspect was a known bookmaker, and (4) the suspect traveled regularly to the apartment indicated. Id. at 413-14.
119 Berner, supra note 104, at 494-95.
120

See notes 51-64 supra and accompanying text.
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The court's predilections can be demonstrated in State v. Mila case where the facts did not compel an application of Aguilar,
but it nevertheless served to foreshadow the treatment Aguilar would
receive by the Weintraub court. In Miller, the Weintraub court approved of a warrantless search of an apartment, premised on information received from an informant. The defendant contended, and the
trial court agreed, 2 2z that the evidence seized as a result of the search
should be suppressed since the informer was " 'unknown, unreliable
and untested,' " and therefore, the tip could not be used to establish
probable cause.'2 3 The supreme court, nonetheless, was willing to
accept the informer's statements despite the absence of a showing
of past reliability, concluding that although the informer "was unknown and unreliable in the sense that he was untested as an in124
former," he was nevertheless not unknown in terms of anonymity."'
Thus, because one detective knew the informer to be a parolee and
the information revealed the presence of a homicide suspect in the
informer's apartment-a possible parole violation-the tip was viewed
25
as reliable. 1
The Weintraub court's inclination to reverse trial court suppression orders where the facts were relatively conclusive vis-ia-vis the
2s
guilt of a defendant is discernible in State v. Kasabucki,' the first
post-Aguilar case in which the court considered the adequacy of a
hearsay-laden affidavit. In Kasabucki, the supreme court reversed an
appellate division affirmation of a trial court's suppression of evidence
seized under a warrant.1 27 The warrant had issued following the presentation of information received by letter from the New York City
Police Department. According to the letter, the Department had
received information that a telephone listed in the defendant's name
was being used for bookmaking purposes. The communication did not
reveal the source of the information; rather it referred to it only as
" '[c]onfidential.' "128 Furthermore, there was no statement in the
affidavit shedding light on the reliability of the New York Police Deler, 12 1

121 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966).
122Id. at 274-75, 220 A.2d at 409-10. The supreme court certified the matter prior to
argument in the appellate division. Id. at 275, 220 A.2d at 410.
123 Id. at 279, 220 A.2d at 412.
124 Id.

125Id. at 279-80, 220 A.2d at 412. The informer's revelation of this parole violation
would constitute an admission against his penal interest.
126 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101 (1968).
127 Id. at 114-15, 123, 244 A.2d at 103, 107.
128 Id. at 118-19, 244 A.2d at 104-05.
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partment's informer. 129 It is apparent that the facts of this case warranted the application of the Aguilar test. It is equally clear that had
the test been applied, it would not have been satisfied, since the issuing magistrate had no basis upon which to conclude that the information was supplied by a reliable or credible person. Nevertheless, the
Weintraub court avoided any mention of Aguilar, basing its conclusion
on the pre-Aguilar test of reasonableness. 130 In language reminiscent
of Miller, the court found a substantial basis for crediting the tip, concluding "that the letter had a ring of authenticity, and that the 'confidential information' about the bookmaking operation was substantial
and reliable."'' The court also stated that the very fact that a mag13 2
istrate had issued a warrant should be prima facie evidence of legality
and binding on another trial judge "unless there was clearly no
33
justification for" the issuance of the warrant. 1
Subsequently, in State v. Mercurio, 1 34 the appellate division
followed the Weintraub court's disregard of Aguilar and relied on the
Kasabucki admonition of according deference to the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause. 1 35 In an opinion which was
affirmed per curiam and adopted in full by the supreme court,' 36 the
13 7
appellate division reversed a trial court's suppression of evidence.
The Mercurio -affidavit had issued upon recital by the affiant of informa38
tion received by means of police surveillance and an informer's tip.1
The tip merely stated that two males were taking bets at a Newark
apartment. 139 The affiant further stated that police investigators had
observed two males arriving at the apartment carrying a daily racing
129 Id.

at 118, 244 A.2d at 104-05.
130Id. at 117, 120, 122-23, 244 A.2d at 104, 106-07. In its description of the
magistrate's role, the court concluded that the approach taken "must be a practical and
realistic one," avoiding technicalities but giving due regard to "the specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of policemen." Id. at 117, 244 A.2d at 104.
131 Id. at 120, 244 A.2d at 106. The court felt that the tip was bolstered to a large
extent by the "prestigious" quality of the letter, as copies had been forwarded to the
prosecutor's office, a local police chief, and the Attorney General of New Jersey. Id.
132Id. at 122-23, 244 A.2d at 107.
133Id. at 117, 244 A.2d at 104.
134113 N.J. Super. 113, 273 A.2d 65 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 57 N.J. 367,
273 A.2d 24 (1971).
135 113 N.J. Super. at 114, 273 A.2d at 65.
136 State v. Mercurio, 57 N.J. 367, 273 A.2d 24 (1971) (per curiam).
137 113 N.J. Super. at 115, 273 A.2d at 66.
'38 Id. at 115, 273 A.2d at 66 (majority opinion).
139 Id. at 116, 273 A.2d at 66 (dissenting opinion). The affidavit did not inform the
magistrate whether the informer personally observed the bookmaking operation. Id.,
273 A.2d at 66-67.
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sheet; telephone calls placed by policemen to the apartment were
"'answered by a male['s]... low husky.., voice just saying "hello"
;
and, from his own personal experience as a vice squad detective, the
above activities reflected the " 'usual practice of one engaged in bookmaking.' "140
The appellate division's two-to-one majority sustained the search,
although noting that "[t]he State concede[d] that the affidavit [was]
barely adequate." 14 1 Despite this concession, the State successfully
argued that when a marginally adequate affidavit is challenged, "'the
doubt should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.' "142
The Mercurio decision is as vulnerable as Kasabucki to attack
under the second prong of Aguilar, since no underlying circumstances
which would enable the magistrate to judge the reliability of the informer were revealed to the court.143 Nor would the affidavit seem to
pass Spinelli's modification of the Aguilar test, since neither the tip
nor the independent police surveillance described any criminal activity but rather recited merely a series of events which, at best, could
144
only be described as "suspicious."
The Weintraub court finally recognized the existence of the
140 Id. at 117, 273 A.2d at 67 (dissenting opinion).
141 Id. at 114-15, 273 A.2d at 65-66.
142 Id. at 114, 273 A.2d at 65 (quoting from State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116, 244
A.2d 101, 103 (1968)).
143 The dissent recognized the propriety of applying Aguilar and Spinelli to the facts
of Mercurio. Judge Carton noted that
the information supplied . . . details no underlying circumstances at all which
would warrant a belief that gambling was taking place on the premises ....
[I]t
is impossible to determine whether the informer personally observed the illegal
activity ....
Since no underlying circumstances are shown, there is no basis in
the supporting document from which the magistrate who issued the warrant
could ascertain the validity of the informer's conclusion that the law was being
violated.
113 N.J. Super. at 116, 273 A.2d at 66-67.
144 Id. at 117-18, 273 A.2d at 67-68 (dissenting opinion).
This position is supported by the following language from Spinelli which seemingly would dictate a result contrary to that reached in Mercurio and provides further evidence of the polarization which existed between the Warren and Weintraub courts on
fourth amendment considerations:
[Tihe allegations detailing the FBI's surveillance of Spinelli and its investigation of the telephone company records contain no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves-and they are not endowed with an aura of
suspicion by virtue of the informer's tip. Nor do we find that the FBI's reports
take on a sinister color when read in light of common knowledge that bookmaking is often carried on over the telephone and from premises ostensibly
used by others for perfectly normal purposes.
393 U.S. at 418.
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Aguilar-Spinelli test in State v. Perry, 1 45 but nevertheless once again
upset the suppression order of an inferior court. 146 In Perry, the suf-

ficiency of the facts upon which the informer based his conclusionthe first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test-was in issue.1 47 The Perry
affidavit recited that a previously reliable informer had provided information that stolen property consisting of " 'monies, jewelry, doctors [sic] bag, [and] Narcotics' " could be located in an apartment at a
specified address. 14 8 Despite the court's recognition that "the affidavit . . .recite[d] no factual allegations by the informant of his own

experience regarding the existence of stolen property in [the] apartment,"' 14 9 it concluded that the elaborate detail of the information
"could reasonably lead a magistrate to infer that the informant had
probably observed the items himself"'150 and that therefore, under
Spinelli, probable cause was properly established.151
It is doubtful whether the mere mention of assorted items presented in the Perry affidavit would have been found sufficient by the
Warren Court to bolster the informer's reliability. In Spinelli, the
Warren Court indicated that more than a general description is required. Spinelli spoke in terms of "minute particularity"' 152 and, in a
Perry-type situation, suggested that the proper degree of detail would
be provided if the informer described not only the items to be found
"but also the appointments and furnishings in the apartment" where
the goods were located.1 53 The rationale for this requirement was that
such a description would increase the probability that the informer
had received his information through personal observation.
Thus, even where the Weintraub court acknowledged the
Aguilar-Spinelli test, the treatment of those cases indicates that the
New Jersey court was only willing to pay lip service to their standards.
However, this philosophical gap between the highest courts of New
Jersey and the United States in the area of probable cause was nar.4,59 N.J. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971).
146Id. at 395, 283 A.2d at 337. The supreme court reversed an unreported appellate division opinion which had determined that the affidavit presented to secure the
search warrant was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 385, 283 A.2d at 331-32.
147The second prong was found to be satisfied by the affiant's assertion that the informer had proved reliable in the past. Id. at 387, 390, 283 A.2d at 333, 334.
148Id. at 387, 283 A.2d at 333.
149Id. at 390, 283 A.2d at 334.
150 Id. at 392, 283 A.2d at 335.
151Id. at 395, 283 A.2d at 337.
152 393 U.S. at 417.

153Id. at 425 (White, J., concurring).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 771

rowed by the Burger Court's decision in United States v. Harris,'54
where a discernible shift away from the Aguilar-Spinelli dictates was
manifested. In Harris, an informer's reliability was at issue; the affidavit presented to the magistrate did not assert that the informer had
previously been the source of a tip that had proven reliable, nor was
any other information provided which, under Spinelli, would have
tended to bolster the informer's reliability. 155 Thus, an adherence to
the Aguilar-Spinelli test would seem to have dictated a rejection of
the Harris affidavit. However, the Harris Court concluded that the
information presented by the affiant, "coupled with affiant's" belief
that the informer was " 'prudent,' " established a sufficient factual
basis of the reliability of the informer and thus, established probable
cause.1 56 In so holding, the Court steered clear from the type of formalized analytical scrutiny demanded by Aguilar and Spinelli in favor
of a less structured approach which effectively revived the "totality of
circumstances" method rejected in Spinelli.15 7 Among the additional
"circumstances" which the Court considered to bolster the reliability
of the tip were (1) the prior reputation of the defendant as a known
158
criminal-an express rejection of one portion of the Spinelli holding
-and (2) the fact that the tip implicated the informer in criminal activity-a declaration against penal interest which, in the Court's opinion, gave the statement its "own indicia of credibility. "'15
The strong similarities in fourth amendment policies between
the Burger and Weintraub courts become readily apparent when
Harris is juxtaposed to the New Jersey court's probable cause decisions. In State v. DiRienzo,' 60 the Weintraub court presaged Harris
by over two years when it concluded that an informer's reliability
could be bolstered if the tip contained a declaration against his penal
interest. 16 ' Furthermore, in State v. Ebron,'6 2 the Weintraub court
1- 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
155 Id. at 575-76. The affidavit merely recited that the untested informer was, in the
opinion of the affiant, " 'prudent.' " Id. at 575. However, the first prong of the Aguilar
test had been satisfied by an affirmation that the informer personally observed the
alleged criminal activity. Id. at 575-76.
156 Id. at 579-80.
157 Id. at 580-83. Chief Justice Burger paid, at best, lip service to the careful scrutiny demanded by Aguilar. Instead, he suggested that the proper approach is to consider the affidavit, as a whole, to determine if the tip and additional corroborating information would provide a substantial basis for a probable cause determination. Id. at
579, 581.
158 Id. at 582-83.
159 Id. at 583-84.
180 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969).
161 Id. at 384-85, 251 A.2d at 112.
162 61 N.J. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972).
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actually extended the Harris holding by allowing a magistrate to consider the prior criminal reputation not only of the defendant himself
but also that of a close relative, as support for an informer's assertions. 163 Thus, in the absence of a Hughes court decision addressing
the relationship of probable cause, informers' tips, and search warrant
affidavits, the standards to be applied in New Jersey are in relative
harmony with those of the present United States Supreme Court.
The New Jersey supreme court's somewhat relaxed standard
in dealing with informers also appeared in its response to an issue
concerning the right of a defendant to controvert "the truth of the
factual assertions contained in the affidavit submitted in support of an
application for a search warrant."' 164 In State v. Petillo,165 the Weintraub court held that a defendant could not go behind the face of the
warrant, and it precluded any challenge to the truthfulness of the af66
fidavit. 1
Petillo alleged that the affiant police officer had perjured himself in regard to material facts in his application for a search warrant. 167
The Weintraub court ruled, however, that the Constitution required
only that the magistrate be satisfied as to the facial sufficiency of the
-affidavit and credibility of the affiant. 16 8 In the court's view, once this
determination had been made, "the legal propriety of the issuance of
the warrant ought to be beyond further question."' 69 Furthermore,
the officer's compliance with the oath requirement "must be regarded
as a procedurally adequate manifestation of his veracity."'170 The court
reasoned that the sanctions of perjury, contempt, and damages would
provide sufficient deterrence of false affidavits.'171
Hearing Petillo's case on a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Stern
of the federal district court of New Jersey viewed the fourth amendment in a different light. He held in United States ex rel. Petillo v.
New Jersey172 that "when a materially inaccurate affidavit, knowingly
163 Id. at 213, 294 A.2d at 4. The affidavit in question contained allegations that the
house in which the Suspect lived was owned by his mother, who previously had been
convicted of a narcotics violation. Id.
164State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 173, 293 A.2d 649, 653 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973).
16561 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
166 61 N.J. at 173, 293 A.2d at 653.
167 Id. at 171, 293 A.2d at 652.
168Id. at 173-74, 293 A.2d at 653.
169Id.

Id. at 174, 293 A.2d at 653.
at 174, 293 A.2d at 654.
172 400 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated and remanded, 541 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.),
originaldecision reinstated and writs of habeas corpus granted, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J.
1976).
17o

171 Id.
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submitted, forms the basis for the issuance of a search warrant," it
violates the mandate of the fourth amendment, and the fruits thereof
must be suppressed. 1 73 Moreover, once a defendant has made "a
prima facie showing of misrepresentations in the supporting affidavit,"
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires "a full,
fair and adequate hearing to determine whether the issuing magistrate
was deceived.'1 74 Finding that petitioner Petillo had made such a show75
ing, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the district court.1
The divergence in the two courts' priorities is illuminating. Justice Francis, writing for the unanimous Weintraub court, stated that
should "police officers lie, the truth of the accused's alleged criminal
activities as revealed by the evidence seized under the warrant will
not be diluted.'1 7 6 The Justice continued:
It must be remembered that the question on such a motion
is not guilt or innocence of the defendant; the issue arises only because the search proved productive. Although that result alone
could not validate a lawless search, it does serve as a reminder that
a balance must be struck, and that the social costs of unwarranted
77
extension of search and seizure principles should not be ignored. 1

In contrast, Judge Stern, taking notice of "the incidence of police
perjury," observed that "[ilt is of paramount importance to the integrity of the judicial process that such writs not be procured by perjury,
deception or other improprieties.' 1 78 Citing specifically the language
employed by Justice Francis, 1 79 the district court judge concluded
that the New Jersey supreme court had "ignore[d] the teaching of
countless cases."'180
The United States Supreme Court has thus far left the question
of permitting veracity challenges unresolved, 18 1 despite the urgings
of Justice White and Chief Justice Burger. 182 The most recent federal
cases on the subject are in general agreement that an inquiry into the
veracity of a search warrant affidavit can be made.'8 3 However, these
173400 F. Supp. at 1157.

Id. at 1183 (emphasis in original).
at 1188-90.
176 61 N.J. at 174, 293 A.2d at 653.
177 Id. at 178, 293 A.2d at 656 (footnote omitted).
178 400 F. Supp. at 1179.
179 See text accompanying note 176 supra.
180 400 F. Supp. at 1180.
181See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
182 North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973, 973-76 (1974) (Burger, C.J., & White, J.,
174

175 Id.

dissenting).
183 See, e.g., United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
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courts differ as to whether suppression is necessitated by negligent
material errors, or only by intentional misstatements. 184 The Weintraub court in Petillo followed what one writer has termed "the traditional rule," which precludes any challenge to the veracity of an affidavit. 185 However, recent decisions in the majority of state courts
have rejected this rule. 186 Thus, the Weintraub court, in adopting
the older rule and rejecting the recent federal and state decisions,
was again lining itself up with those courts which have adopted a restrictive view of the individual's right to be free from illegal search
and seizure.
SEARCHES INCIDENTAL TO ARREST

The Supreme Court has recognized various exceptions to the
87
general requirement that a warrant be issued prior to a search.'
Among these exceptions is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.' 8 8
The propriety of this search is well established; 189 however, the permissible extent of such a search has been alternately expanded and
contracted. 190
U.S. 965 (1976); United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976); United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart,
492 F.2d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v.
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975); United
States v. Gonzales, 488 F.2d 833, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Carmichael,
489 F.2d 983, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322,
324 (10th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 40-41 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974). See generally Herman, Warrants for Arrest or
Search: Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 OHIo S.L.J.
721 (1975); Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1971); Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient
Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False?, U.C.L.A.L. REV. 96 (1971); Note, Search
Warrant Affidavits-The ConstitutionalConstraints, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 623 (1974).
,84 Note, supra note 183, at 637-38.
185 Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title III: Another Dissent to
Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 750, 796 (1975).
186 See Comment, Challenges to the Veracity of Facially Sufficient Warrants-Is the
Truth Relevant?, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 843-44 (1976).
187 See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
188United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). This exception allows a
search of the arrestee's person and the area within his control. It is this second proposition, the extent of the arrestee's area of "control," which has been given varied interpretation by the Court. Id.
189See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
190 Compare Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
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At the time Chief Justice Warren assumed his position on the
Supreme Court, 19 1 the test which governed the legality of a warrantless search incidental to an arrest was "reasonableness under all the
circumstances," as established in United States v. Rabinowitz. 19 2 Subsequently, the Warren Court, by applying a narrow definition of reasonableness, generally rendered decisions which resulted in contracting the permissible extent of the search. 193 Finally, in Chimel v.

752 (1969), and Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), with United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). See also
Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 108-09 (1972).
191Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed to the Supreme Court by President
Eisenhower in 1953. 347 U.S. in-Iv n.2 (1954).
192339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). In Rabinowitz, the Court determined that the search
of a person's office following his arrest was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 58-59, 63-66. In reaching this determination, the Court relied upon Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152-53, 155 (1947), where the search of a four room apartment subsequent to an arrest had been upheld. 339 U.S. at 63. The Harris Court had
emphasized that the search was conducted in good faith and that it was not of a general
exploratory nature "but was specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities"
of the crime. 331 U.S. at 153. In Rabinowitz, the Court compared the office search at
issue with the search of the apartment exclusively controlled by Harris, see 339 U.S. at
63, and noted that, like the search in Harris, it "was not general or exploratory" but was
specific. Id. at 62-63.
The Rabinowitz majority recognized that difficulties might arise in determining
whether a search was reasonable under the circumstances, but it stated that the question "must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 63.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, criticized the lack of guidance offered by the majority. Id. at 83-84. He argued that the Supreme Court should establish the criteria for
the lower courts and that "[i]t [was] no criterion of reason to say that the district court
must find it reasonable." Id. at 83.
In reaching its decision in Rabinowitz, the Court overruled its holding in Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 339 U.S. at 66. Trupiano was a post-Harris case
in which the Court had invalidated a search accompanying an arrest on the ground that
the arresting officers had failed to obtain a warrant despite the fact that they had time
to do so. 334 U.S. at 703-05. Rabinowitz expressly overruled Trupiano insofar as it had
required that a warrant be obtained in those instances where it is practicable to do so. 339
U.S. at 66.
193 See, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968) (search
of car after defendants were arrested for reckless driving and were already in courthouse
held " 'too remote in time or place to [be] incidental to the arrest' " (quoting from Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964))); James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 37 (1965)
(search of home located two blocks from site of arrest held not incidental to arrest);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964) (search of defendant's apartment two
days prior to arrest held not incidental to arrest); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
366-68 (1964) (search of car following defendant's booking held "unreasonable" and
not incidental to arrest). But see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59-62 (1967) (search
of car one week after narcotics arrest held reasonable, where car had been impounded
under state statutory forfeiture provision).
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California,194 the Court declined to follow Rabinowitz and held that
such searches were to be confined only to the person arrested and to
that "area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon
195
or something that could have been used as evidence against him."'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey under Chief Justice Weintraub also applied the Rabinowitz "reasonableness" test in cases concerning searches incidental to an arrest.' 96 However, it did not employ
the Warren Court's increasing restrictions on the meaning of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. 1 97 The Weintraub court's
reluctance to restrict the scope of searches incidental to arrests is particularly evident in cases decided subsequent to Chimel.
In State v. Carter,198 the court upheld a warrantless search of
an automobile at police headquarters after the defendants had been
taken into custody.1 99 Chief Justice Weintraub acknowledged Chimel
but stated that it was clear that the Chimel rationale "may not be applied literally to a motor vehicle."200 He also speculated that Chimel
might not be made retroactive by the Supreme Court, adding that he
did not favor such "application of new constitutional concepts."201
194 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

195Id. at 768. In Chimel, the petitioner was arrested at his home for the burglary of
a coin shop. Id. at 753. Over his objections, the police searched his entire house for
nearly an hour and seized numerous items which were subsequently admitted at trial
and which resulted in the petitioner's conviction. Id. at 753-54. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that it was unreasonable to extend the scope of a search
incidental to an arrest beyond that area which was "within [the] immediate control"
of the person arrested. Id. at 763, 768.
196 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 282-85, 220 A.2d 409, 414-15 (1966) (search
of all accessible areas found reasonable although arrestee had no property interest in
areas searched); State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 343-45, 200 A.2d 606, 611-12 (1964) (entire apartment considered within defendants' "control" in search for implements of
abortion).
197See cases cited note 206 infra.
198 54 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970), judgment
vacated and new trial ordered, 69 N.J. 420, 354 A.2d 627 (1976).
199 54 N.J. at 446-49, 255 A.2d at 752-54. The court stressed the fact that the search
had occurred during the early hours of the morning and within a relatively short time
after delivery of the automobile to police headquarters. Id. For the Supreme Court's
recognition of the special nature of automobile searches see Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
200 54 N.J. at 449, 255 A.2d at 753. The opinion noted that Chimel did not reject the
Court's decision in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 58-62 (1967), which had upheld
a warrantless search of an automobile one week after it had been taken into custody.
54 N.J. at 449, 255 A.2d at 754.
201 54 N.J. at 449, 255 A.2d at 753. The Supreme Court initially had refused to consider whether Chimel would be retroactively applied. See Von Cleef v. New Jersey,
395 U.S. 814, 815 (1969) (decided the same day as Chimel). The Court ultimately ruled
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In State v. McNair,2 0 2 also a post-Chirnel decision, the New
Jersey court eschewed the approach in Chimel and applied a straight
reasonableness test, finding that a warrantless search of a three-room
store-including the search of a locked closet-was lawful. 20 3 The
court distinguished Chimel on the grounds that what Chimel had condemned was "a general exploratory" search of a dwelling and questioned its application to a search involving store premises. 20 4 The court
ultimately took refuge in the fact that Chimel had not been made retroactive and hence was not controlling, since the arrest had occurred
20 5
prior to that decision.
The Carter and McNair decisions typify the Weintraub court's
20 6
approach to determining legality under the fourth amendment.
By factually distinguishing such cases from similar Warren Court
cases, the Weintraub court was able to avoid the impact of the Warren
Court's increasing restrictions on the permissible scope of searches
incidental to arrests.
The more restrictive approach of the Warren Court may be shortlived, however, since recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a retreat from the Chimel limitations on searches incidental to arrests. In
United States v. Robinson, 20 7 the Court concluded that a custodial
search of a person arrested for a motor vehicle violation was constitutionally permissible. 20 8 Although the search conducted in Robinson arguably comported with the Chimel standards in that it did not
extend beyond the person arrested, 20 9 the Court went further and

against Chimel's retroactive application in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 651,
658 (1971).
202 60 N.J. 8, 285 A.2d 553 (1972).
20
3ld. at 12-16, 285 A.2d at 555-57. Stressing the fact that only unreasonable searches
were prohibited by the fourth amendment, the court, in essence, took the Rabinowitz
approach without expressly relying upon that decision. Id. at 12, 14-16, 285 A.2d at
555, 556-57.
204 Id. at 16, 285 A.2d at 557.
205 Id. at 16-17, 285 A.2d at 557-58. The arrest had taken place eighteen days prior
to the Chimel decision. See id.
206 For an additional post-Chimel decision exemplifying the Weintraub court's
more expansive notion of reasonableness see State v. La Porte, 62 N.J. 312, 314-17, 301
A.2d 146, 148-49 (1973). For pre-Chimel decisions see State v. Campbell, 53 N.J. 230,
250 A.2d 1 (1969); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967). See also cases cited
note 196 supra.
207 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
208 Id. at 220-21, 236. The Court rejected the argument that no search should be

permitted to exceed the "pat-down" search standards enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). 414 U.S. at 227-29, 234-35.
209 See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
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stressed the importance of the police officer's judgment in determining the manner and extent of the search necessary under the circumstances.2 10 In this sense, the opinion reflects the approach taken in
21
Rabinowitz. 1
The Burger Court's apparent disavowal of the Warren Court
restrictions is further evidenced in the Court's decision in United
States v. Edwards,2 12 in which it upheld a search of an arrestee's clothing the day after his arrest.2 13 The Court, stressing the reasonableness of the search under the circumstances, reasoned that the search
did not exceed that which could have been performed at the time and
214
place of arrest.
Thus, it appears that the Burger Court is unwilling to maintain
the restrictions established by the Warren Court concerning the scope
of searches incidental to arrests. Although Chimel has not been specifically overruled, the effect of the Robinson and Edwards decisions
can certainly be viewed as limiting the impact of that decision.

210 414 U.S. at 235.
211 The Court in Rabinowitz suggested that "flexibility" should be given to law enforcement officers in making a determination as to whether or where to arrest and search
persons suspected of crime. See 339 U.S. at 65.
212 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
213 Id. at 801-02.

214 Id. at 805. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the issue of whether the
search was sufficiently contemporaneous, it relied upon Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967), to support the proposition that warrantless searches conducted some time
after the detention of the arrestee may be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment although the search itself was not contemporaneous. 415 U.S. at 806-07.
A number of recent state court decisions have rejected the approach of the Burger
Court to searches incidental to arrest. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 54952, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329-31 (1975) (relying on state constitutional provision); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 368-70, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974)
(same); People v. Kelly, 77 Misc. 2d 264, 268-69, 353 N.Y.S.2d 111, 116-17 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. Bronx County) (relying on state appellate court decision), modified on appeal, 79
Misc. 2d 534, 361 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1974). See also Comment, The Scope
of Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests in California: Rejecting the Federal Rule, 9
U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 317 (1974). One state legislature, Massachusetts, has also rejected the Burger Court's approach by enacting legislation limiting the scope of a search
incidental to an arrest. See Act of July 10, 1974, ch. 508, [1974] Mass. Acts 469 (codified
at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1976)), which provides:
A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of
seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for
which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.
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MINIMIZATION

The Warren Court in Katz v. United States2 15 and in Berger v.
New York 2 16 held that the act of intercepting an oral communication,
whether by means of wiretapping or electronic surveillance, was a
search and a seizure and, as such, the panoply of fourth amendment
protections would be available to the conversants. 2 17 Regardless of
whether or not an actual physical trespass had occurred, wiretapping
or eavesdropping could not be carried out without a warrant issued
upon a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial
officer. 2 18 Additionally, the Warren Court required that the warrant
must describe with particularity "the communications, conversations,
or discussions to be seized." 2 19 This requirement of specificity guarantees the freedom from indiscriminate personal intrusions which the
220
fourth amendment seeks to protect.
The decisions in Katz and Berger eventually led to the promulgation of statutory guidelines set forth in both the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968221 and the New Jersey Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. 22 2 Under both acts, judicial
orders authorizing electronic eavesdropping must instruct officers to
conduct surveillance in a manner which minimizes the interception of
conversations not falling within the scope of the authorization. 223 Al215 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
216388 U.S. 41 (1967).

217 389 U.S. at 353, 358-59; 388 U.S. at 51, 54-60, 63-64.
218 389 U.S. at 353, 356-57; 388 U.S. at 54-56, 60.
219 388 U.S. at 59.
220 See id. at 55-56, 58-59.

221 Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970)).
As to minimization, the federal statute requires that
[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment
of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) (emphasis added).
For further discussion of the federal wiretap statute see Cranwell, Judicial FineTuning of Electronic Surveillance, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 225 (1975); Schwartz, The
Legitimation of ElectronicEavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L.
REV. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case
in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969).
222 Law of Jan. 1, 1969, ch. 409, [1968] N.J. Laws 1395, as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:156A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1976-77). For the language of the New Jersey statute which
mandates minimization see text accompanying note 233 infra.
223See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (Supp. 1976-
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though the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the requirement
of minimization, the New Jersey supreme court under Chief Justice
Weintraub addressed the issue and prescribed the remedy to be accorded by state courts which encounter a violation of the state statutory
minimization requirement. In State v. Dye,2 2 4 the court faced what
appeared to be a direct violation of New Jersey's wiretap act. Less
than three percent of the recorded conversations in that case were
deemed "material" to the defendant and his suspected bookmaking
activities. 225 Dye claimed that the indiscriminate tapping of telephone
conversations to which he was a party directly breached the New
Jersey minimization requirement. Dye argued that the statutorily
mandated remedy was suppression of all the evidence seized.2 2 6
In interpreting the legislative design behind the wiretap act, the
court reasoned that the legislature could not have contemplated denying the government's use of all wiretap evidence merely because certain noncriminal statements were recorded as well. Rather, in the
court's opinion, the legislature intended that the judiciary administer
the wiretap statute in a manner "which would reasonably accomplish
the [act's] desired purpose.- 22 7 This required that the courts be aware
of the difficulties related to wiretapping, including "the obvious fact
that officers monitoring the tap cannot be sufficiently prescient to
know that a particular conversation will remain innocent and irrelevant. ''228 The court concluded that where a continuous monitoring re77). Both acts also provide the elements of the wiretap order and the remedy of suppression of the evidence for a violation thereof. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (1970); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-12, -21 (Supp. 1976-77).
224 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972).
225 See 60 N.J. at 528-29, 291 A.2d at 839. The police had intercepted all conversations conducted through a public telephone from Monday through Saturday between
the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. The recordings were made over a 24-day period. Id.
at 525, 535, 291 A.2d at 828, 833.
226 See 60 N.J. at 535, 291 A.2d at 833-34. Defendant Dye had partially relied upon
the lower court holding in State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. 276, 284 A.2d 385 (Essex
County Ct. 1971), rev'd, 122 N.J. Super. 181, 299 A.2d 750 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 62
N.J. 574, 303 A.2d 327 (1973), before that case had been reversed by the appellate division. 60 N.J. at 540, 291 A.2d at 836. In Molinaro, the trial court had found that approximately 45 percent of the monitored calls were unrelated to the alleged crime. 117 N.J.
Super. at 284-85, 284 A.2d at 389-90. The trial court found, therefore, that the statute
mandated the suppression of all the evidence seized. Id. at 293-95, 284 A.2d at 394. The
appeal in Molinaro was heard after the supreme court's decision in State v. Dye. Controlled by the Weintraub court's holding therein, the appellate division reversed the
Molinaro decision, thus admitting the inculpatory evidence. 122 N.J. Super. at 182-83,
299 A.2d at 751.
227 60 N.J. at 539, 291 A.2d at 835-36.
228 Id. at 538, 291 A.2d at 835.
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sulted in the interception of inculpatory and irrelevant material, "the
legislative objective and the various interests involved can be served
communications and excluding
reasonably by admitting the relevant
' 2 29
or suppressing the irrelevant."
The Weintraub court's interpretation of the rule of minimization
rendered it a nullity. The only sanction applied in a case of overreach2 30
ing by the police would be the exclusion of "irrelevant" evidence.
Such a penalty would hardly act as an effective deterrent to police
violations, especially in light of the Weintraub court's definition of irrelevant. As Justice Francis explained,
if in the course of a wiretap . . . a conversation turns to the commission of an unrelated crime, failure to terminate the interception will not bar use of the evidence in proving the crime dis23
cussed. '

Thus, only innocent conversations were deemed irrelevant.
Since the decision in Dye, the New Jersey legislature has amended
its wiretap act 23 2 to require the government to minimize "by making

reasonable efforts, whenever possible, to reduce the hours of interception authorized by [the wiretap] order.'"233 Failure to do so results
23 4
in the suppression of all the intercepted conversations.
The Burger Court has not specifically dealt with the question of
minimization. However, a reading of the Court's decision in United
States v. Kahn, 23 5 together with the denial of certiorari to a number
of minimization cases, 23 6 arguably indicates a somewhat relaxed at229 Id. at 539, 291 A.2d at 836. For the court's definition of "irrelevant" see text accompanying notes 230-31 infra.
230 See 60 N.J. at 540-42, 291 A.2d 836-37.
231 Id. at 541, 291 A.2d at 836.
232 Ch. 131 [1975] N.J. Sess. L. Serv. 289 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1
et seq. (Supp. 1976-77)).
233 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12 (Supp. 1976-77). Additionally, the amended
statute restricts the duration of an interception order to an initial period of 20 days, 10
days less than had previously been allowed, and more severely limits the number and
duration of extensions or renewals of such orders. Id.
234 Id. § 2A:156A-21. The granting of a motion to suppress will exclude from evidence "all intercepted wire or oral communications obtained during or after any interception which is determined to be in violation of this act." Id. (emphasis added). This
language is conspicuously devoid of any reference to "relevance," and is obviously intended to provide a measure of sanction missing in the original act as construed by the
New Jersey supreme court in Dye.
-5 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
236 See Scott v. United States, 425 U.S. 917 (1976), denying cert. to 504 F.2d 194
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952, denying cert. to 513 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir. 1975); Dye v. New Jersey, 409 U.S. 1090, denying cert. to 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d
825 (1975).
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titude toward minimization on the part of the Burger Court.
In Kahn, the Court dealt with a federal wiretap order which authorized the interception of " 'wire communications of Irving Kahn
and others as yet unknown.' "237 Incriminating conversations of Irving
Kahn's wife, Minnie Kahn, were intercepted and subsequently suppressed as evidence at trial by the district court.23 8 On appeal, the
issue was whether Minnie Kahn was a person " 'as yet unknown' " so
that her intercepted conversations came within the scope of the wiretap order and thus could be admissible as evidence.2 3 9 In deciding the
issue, the court of appeals stressed the congressional intent underlying the wiretap law-" 'safeguard[ing] the privacy of innocent persons' " 2 4 0-and found that Congress did not intend the class of those
" 'as yet unknown' " to be extended to those whose involvement in
criminal activity would have been disclosed by careful police investigation.2 4 1 Thus, since the Government failed to identify Minnie Kahn
in its wiretap application where, in the court's view, "prudent investigation" would have revealed her use of the telephone for illegal activity, the court held that Minnie Kahn could not be included among
the " 'unknown' " class and therefore the wiretap order did not au2 42
thorize the interception of her conversation.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court recognized the concern for
personal privacy but emphasized the congressional intent "to authorize
electronic surveillance as a weapon against the operations of organized
crime.'243 In the Court's view, although the authorities were aware
of the existence of Minnie Kahn, they did not have probable cause to
suspect her of criminal activities; therefore, "she was among the class
of persons [who were] 'as yet unknown.' "244 The Court concluded
that the wiretap statute requires the Government to name in its appli-

237415 U.S. at 147.
231 United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 192-94 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143
(1974).
239United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 195 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143

(1974).
240

United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143

(1974) (quoting from Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, tit. III, § 801(d), 82 Stat. 211). See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
10-11, 27-29, 66-70, 88-108 (1968).
241 United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143

(1974).
242

United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143

(1974).
243 415

244

U.S. at 151 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 155.
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cation only those for whom there exists probable cause to believe that
they have participated in the offense justifying the wiretap. 245 This
construction gives wide sweep to the class of individuals "as yet unknown," and thus entitles the Government to intercept conversations
of those known to the authorities, but under a lesser degree of suspicion. 246 The Kahn Court was confident that the statutory minimization requirement would prevent a wiretap order from resulting in a
"'general warrant,' "247 but its decision did not attempt to establish
24 8
federal guidelines to govern minimization.
Kahn demonstrates a ready acceptance by the Burger Court of
the use of electronic eavesdropping and places that Court in a position
generally parallel to the Weintraub court in Dye. Arguably, the failure
of the Burger Court to grant certiorari to a number of minimization
cases may be indicative of the Court's acceptance of a rather diluted
minimization rule. 2 49 This continuing refusal to address the issue of

minimization is paradoxical in light of the importance of that concept
as recognized in Kahn. The Court's existing philosophy in this area,
however, indicates that if the Court were to rule on the subject, it
would construe the minimization requirement in a manner which
would least restrict law enforcement activities and yet remain within
the Berger-Katz guidelines.

245

Id.

246 Id. at 152-53, 155.

247 Id. at 154 (quoting from United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 197 (7th Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 415 U.S. 143 (1974)).
248 415 U.S. at 150.
249

The Court refused to grant certiorari recently in Scott v. United States, 425 U.S.

917 (1976), and Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952 (1975).
Justice Brennan, dissenting in both cases, charged the majority with failing to address the minimization issue. 425 U.S. at 917-26; 423 U.S. at 958-59. He argued for the
promulgation of federal minimization standards which would give substance to title III
and would satisfy the constitutional imperatives which, he believed, motivated Congress to enact it. 425 U.S. at 924-26; 423 U.S. at 952-53.
Justice Brennan's dissents were prompted by what he perceived to be a critical
necessity in light of the Court's previous decision in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143
(1974). In Kahn, the Court had broadened the effective sweep of wiretap orders with
respect to persons whose conversations could be intercepted. In reaching this decision the Court had purported to rely upon the existence of the minimization statute in
order to insure that federal agents were not allowed "total unfettered discretion" in
the execution of a wiretap order. Id. at 154. However, in Scott, though faced with a clear
violation of the minimization statute, 425 U.S. at 918-21 (dissenting opinion), the Court
denied certiorari. Id. at 917 (majority opinion).
Justice Brennan stated that, in the face of such a pressing need for minimization
standards, "[i]naction can only continue evisceration of the statutory mandate." Id. at
926 (dissenting opinion).
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Although it is well established that government searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause "are per se unreasonable,- 25 0 consent searches are another exception to that proposition. 25 1 The consent search exception rests on the authority of citizens

2 52
to permit a search so long as the permission is given voluntarily.
The disagreement between the United States Supreme Court and
New Jersey's highest court has centered on the question of what constitutes an adequate showing of voluntariness.
A precise characterization of the Warren Court's position on consent searches is virtually impossible, since that Court addressed the
issue directly in only one case, Burnper v. North Carolina.25 3 In

Bumper, the Court addressed the narrow issue of whether consent
granted in response to an officer's claim of possession of a search war-

rant is adequate "to justify the lawfulness of a search. "254 The Court
placed "the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given" upon the prosecution 2 55 and required more than a

250

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original); accord,

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); United States v. Hickman,
523 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). See Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
251 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); United States v. Payne,
429 F.2d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1970); see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970).
252 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.2d 1313, 1316
(10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); Bradley v.
Cowan, 500 F.2d 380, 381-82 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Horton, 488 F.2d 374,
380 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d
649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
25" 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The Warren Court dealt generally with third-party consent
searches in two cases, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), and Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964). These cases dealt with the issue of authority of third parties to give
consent to search another's property but did not discuss the question of voluntariness.
Bumper was also a third-party consent case, but the decision squarely rested ol the
issue of voluntariness. In that case, the grandmother of a rape suspect permitted four
law enforcement officers to search her home, in which the suspect also resided. The
purported consent was granted after the officers claimed they possessed a search warrant, which they neither read nor showed to the suspect's grandmother. 391 U.S. at
546-47. The search resulted in the seizure of various items belonging to the accused.
At the subsequent suppression hearing, the prosecution sought to justify the search
strictly on the grounds of the grandmother's consent. Id. at 546. The trial court ruled the
seized materials admissible, finding a valid consent. Id. at 547-48.
254 Id. at 548.
255 Id. (footnote omitted).
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mere showing of "acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." 256 Ultimately, the Court concluded that a situation where an officer claims
the right to search a premises under a warrant "is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion," and that such coercion precludes a finding of consent.257
Presumably, the facts of Bumper made it unnecessary for the
Court to elucidate what the Government need show to "prov[e] that
. . . consent was . . . freely and voluntarily given. "258 The Court's
narrow holding in Bumper was consistent with two pre-Warren decisions which had regarded the granting of consent to a search as a
waiver of a constitutional right but had failed to establish affirmative
59
criteria for measuring voluntariness1
256 Id. at 548-49 (footnote omitted). This standard had previously been employed by
several circuit courts of appeals. See, e.g., Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617, 618
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966) ("the consent must not be contaminated by any duress or coercion and the government has the burden of proof"); Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965) (voluntary "consent ... must be ...
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and . . . [t]he government has the burden of
proving that such consent has been given" (citation omitted)); Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (when "the Government alleges [the] absence" of intimidation or duress, "it has the burden of convincing the court that they are in fact absent"); Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639, 639 (6th Cir. 1931) (when government officers conduct a warrantless search of a dwelling, "the burden is on the government to
show that the owner voluntarily consented to the search").
257 391 U.S. at 550.

258 Id. at 548 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the facts in Bumper see note 253
supra.
259 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921). Like Bumper, both Johnson and Amos invalidated purported
consent searches on the ground that the Government had failed to show more than an
acquiescence to official authority made "under color of office." 333 U.S. at 13, 15, 17;
see 255 U.S. at 315-17.
In Amos, federal officers were admitted without a search warrant into defendant's
store by his wife after they told her that they had come to search for illegal whiskey.
255 U.S. at 315. The search disclosed illicit whiskey, some of which was admitted into
evidence at trial. Id.
The Supreme Court found that the warrantless search and seizure was a "plain
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Id. at 315-16. Moreover, due to "the
implied coercion" inherent in the situation, which itself vitiated any waiver, the Court
did not reach the issue of whether or not a wife could waive her husband's constitutional rights. Id. at 317.
The rationale underlying the Amos decision, that consent to a search amounted to
a waiver of "constitutional rights," id., influenced many later federal cases. See, e.g.,
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628
(1946); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Payne,
429 F.2d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1970); Salata v. United States, 286 F. 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1923);
United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490-91 (S.D. Ill. 1921).
In Johnson, a detective and four narcotics officers, acting on a tip from a confidential informant, obtained entry to a drug suspect's living quarters by asking to " 'talk
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The leading consent search decision of the Weintraub court is
State v. King.2 60 This decision, by adopting various criteria for measuring voluntariness from lower federal court decisions, went further
in establishing guidelines for consent than had the Warren Court. The
case suggests that the Weintraub court was less willing than the Warren Court to invalidate a purported consent search on the basis of
implied coercion where an individual acceded to a police request to
search.
In King, a police officer and the defendant met in a cocktail
lounge and various factors made the officer suspect that King was involved in a robbery. 26 1 Later, the officer went to King's home and told
him the police wanted to question him at the police station. They
went to a car where a second detective was waiting, and King "got into
the backseat."2 62 The rest of the facts were disputed, but the trial
court accepted the state's version of the facts 2 63 which indicated that
the detective asked him if they could search the apartment and
he said, "all right." They got out of the car, which had remained
parked, and the defendant let the police officers into the apartment
by unlocking the door. Detective Shepperson asked Mrs. Ford
[with whom the defendant was living] for permission to search the
264
apartment and she stated that she didn't care.

The police then searched the premises and discovered the evidence
which was later sought to be suppressed. The trial court held the consent voluntary.2 65 The appellate division reversed, 2 66 holding that
to [her] a little bit.' - 333 U.S. at 12. The officers, once admitted, proceeded with a
search of the room, which resulted in the discovery of opium and smoking paraphernalia.
Suppression of this evidence was refused by the district court, and the suspect's ultimate conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. Id.
Citing Amos, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the entry by the officers,
which was the beginning of the search, was demanded under color of office.
It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding
and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.
Id. at 13. The Court also rejected the Government's argument that the search was valid
as an incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 15-17.
For a discussion of the Amos and Johnson decisions see Wefing & Miles, Consent
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 217-27 (1974).
260 44 1N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965).
261 id. at 349, 209 A.2d at 111-12.
262

Id.

Id. at
1d. at
265 Id. at
266 State

351, 209 A.2d at 113.
350-51, 209 A.2d at 112.
351, 209 A.2d at 112-13.
v. King, 84 N.J. Super. 297, 201 A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1964), rev'd, 44 N.J.
346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965).
263
264
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even accepting the testimony of the police as true, it indicated the
consent was given in "an atmosphere . . . more conducive to a yield-

ing to police authority than to the free and intelligent waiver by defendant of his constitutional rights.- 26 7 The supreme court reversed,
holding unanimously that there was no basis for reversing the trial
court's determination that the consent was voluntary. 268 "To be voluntary," the court held, "the consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.' "269 The court denied the
existence of any singular factor which in and of itself could be dispositive of whether that standard had been met, stating that each "case
necessarily depends upon its own facts."-2 70 The court did, however,
identify various criteria which would tend to show whether a particular
consent was coerced 27 1 or freely given, 272 and it finally concluded that
the question of voluntariness is best resolved by the trial judge rather
than an appellate court. 273 Once the trial judge resolved that question
"by [his] consideration of the totality of the particular circumstances
of the case before him," the decision should stand unless "clearly erroneous. "274

One may only speculate whether the Warren Court would have
found a valid consent on the facts of King-facts which indicate that
267 Id. at 302, 201 A.2d at 761 (citations omitted).
268 44 N.J. at 355-56, 209 A.2d at 115.
269 Id. at 352, 209 A.2d at 113 (quoting from Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651
(D.C. Cir. 1951)).
270 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d at 114.
271 Id. at 352-53, 209 A.2d at 113. Cases cited by the King court indicating factors
which tended to show the presence of coercion include United States v. Ziemer, 291 F.2d
100, 101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961) (consent initially refused); Channel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 220-21 (9th Cir. 1960) (consent given by jailed defendant
not present at search); United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960) (consent given by handcuffed defendant); Higgins v. United
States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (consent "accompanied by denial of guilt");
United States v. Busby, 126 F. Supp. 845, 846 (D.D.C. 1954) (consent and denial of guilt
given by one under arrest). 44 N.J. at 352-53, 209 A.2d at 113.
272 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d at 113-14. Cases cited by the King court as highlighting factors indicative of voluntariness include United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65,
70 (1944) (consent given immediately following admission of guilt); United States v.
Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963) (consent given
by one who "actively assisted" the police in locating contraband); United States v.
Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949, 950 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959) (consent
given by an individual who knew the contraband was well hidden). 44 N.J. at 353, 209
A.2d at 113-14. See also United States v. De Vivo, 190 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)
(consent given by defendant who "claim[ed] ignorance that the goods were contraband").
273 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d at 114.
274 Id. at 353-54, 209 A.2d at 114 (emphasis in original).
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at the time consent was given, the defendant was alone and under
arrest at 1:30 a.m., in the rear of a police car, and that he had denied
his guilt.2 75 Perhaps King is best viewed as an example of the Weintraub court purporting to accede to the general constitutional requirement that consent to government searches be granted voluntarily,
while interpreting the facts in a manner which would effectuate its
implicit policy of not barring the admission of probative evidence on
fourth amendment grounds.
The issue of whether evidence of a defendant's knowledge of his
right to refuse consent constitutes an essential element of proof of a
voluntary consent was never addressed by the Warren Court. Nor
was it specifically discussed by the Weintraub court, although the
language of King suggests that the court would have been likely to reject such a requirement.2 76 The Burger Court and the Hughes court
have split dramatically on this question, indicating that the change in
composition of the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey
supreme court since the late 1960's has brought those tribunals no
closer to agreement on search and seizure matters. Ironically, it is
now the state court which has adopted the more protective posture
regarding individual rights.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 2 77 the Burger Court, seeking to
establish standards by which to measure the validity of consent
searches, 27 8 first reaffirmed that the burden of proving the voluntariness of a consent search rested upon the government.2 79 Specifically
limiting its holding to noncustodial consent situations, 280 the Court
held that
[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to estab28 1
lishing a voluntary consent.

Justice Stewart, writing for a six-to-three majority, 282 felt an appro275 Id. at 350, 209 A.2d at 112.
276 The King court discussed factors that might indicate whether or not consent was
freely given, see notes 271-72 supra, but it noted that the presence of one or more of
these factors would not determine the issue. 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d at 114.
277 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
278 Id. at 219, 223,
279 Id. at 222. See text accompanying note 255 supra.
280 412 U.S. at 241 n.29, 247 n.36, 248.
281 Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
282 Id. at 218. In Bustamonte, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall each dis-
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priate standard of voluntariness must accommodate both the public
need for consent searches as a law enforcement tool and the interest
of the individual to be free from official coercion. 28 3 The Court observed that a balancing of similar competing concerns had been reflected in pre-Miranda confession cases in which a "totality of all the
surrounding circumstances" approach had been adopted for determining the voluntariness of admissions of guilt. 28 4 The Court in Miranda
had ultimately ruled that the state's failure to forewarn an individual
in custody of his right to remain silent rendered any confession invalid, 28 5 without regard to any other circumstances. In Bustamonte, however, Justice Stewart rejected the notion that such warnings should
be a prerequisite to a valid consent search. 286 He contrasted the insented separately. Id. at 275, 276, 277. Justice Douglas stated that mere " 'verbal assent' " was insignificant, inferring that an indication of knowledge of a right to refuse
consent was necessary. Id. at 275 (relying upon Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d
699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)). Believing that the Court had acted
prematurely in hearing this matter, he would have allowed the court of appeals to remand to the district court for a determination of the defendant's knowledge of his right
to refuse consent. 412 U.S. at 276.
Justice Brennan also inferred that knowledge of a right to refuse consent was necessary, arguing that the majority's holding would permit a person to waive a constitutional right despite the fact that he might be unaware of its existence. Id. at 277.
Justice Marshall felt that knowledge of a right to refuse consent was an indispensable
element in a valid consent search. Id. at 285. He noted that such knowledge could be
demonstrated by the defendant's responses at the time of the search, such as a prior
refusal of consent or by a showing of "prior experience or training of the" defendant
indicating an awareness of this right. Id. at 286. Although he recognized these methods
of demonstrating knowledge of the defendant, he stated that the prosecution's burden
of showing knowledge would disappear if the police informed defendant of his rights
at the time of the search. Id.
283

Id. at 225.

Id. at 226. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 606 (1961); Reck v.
Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562, 567 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957);
cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-601 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
153 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940). The Court noted that in
each of these cases it had examined all the surrounding circumstances to "asses[s] the
psychological impact on the accused, and evaluat[e] the legal significance of how the
accused reacted." 412 U.S. at 226.
285 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467 (1966).
286 412 U.S. at 231. The Court noted that "both federal and state courts" have
"almost universally repudiated" the suggestion that warnings need to be given to an
individual prior to conducting a search based upon consent. Id. at 231 & nn.13 & 14
(footnotes omitted). See Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281, 284 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972); United States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144, 147 (9th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 957 (1971); United States ex rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096, 1101
(3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 912 (1968). But see
284
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formal atmosphere of the individual's home or the highway, where
consent searches were likely to be requested, with the inherently
coercive atmosphere in which custodial interrogations commonly occur, and concluded that with regard to consent searches, warnings
2 7
"would be thoroughly impractical.The proposition that consent searches fell within the Court's mandate of Johnson v. Zerbst2 88 also was rejected by Justice Stewart.2 89
The Court in Zerbst held that in order to establish the validity of a
waiver of a constitutional right, the state need show "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."2 90
The Bustamonte Court, however, found the Zerbst standard applicable only to waivers of constitutional rights essential to accord a criminal defendant a fair trial.2 91 Since the fourth amendment seeks to
protect the right of the individual to be free from unreasonable state
intrusion, rather than aiding in the ascertainment of the truth, Justice Stewart believed that the waiver of this right was not likely to affect the fairness of a criminal trial.2 9 2 Therefore, he saw no reason to
extend the Zerbst standard to search and seizure cases.2 93
Commentators have criticized various aspects of Justice Stewart's reasoning in Bustamonte,2 94 however, it is clear that by this
United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Moderacki,
280 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
287 412 U.S. at 231-32. Recognizing that an officer's request to search might be
based on rapidly developing circumstances or as a consequence of an investigation,
Justice Stewart noted that the Miranda decision was not intended to hinder police
investigations. Id. at 232.
288 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
289 412 U.S. at 235.
290 304 U.S. at 464. It is interesting to note that, in Zerbst, the Court stated that
"[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver" must be made
upon the "facts and circumstances" in each case. Id.
291 412 U.S. at 235.
292 Id. at 241-42.
293 Id. at 243-45.
294 See, e.g., Recent Development, Valid Consent to Search Determined by Standard of "Voluntariness", 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 249 (1974) (Court's decision that
voluntariness is to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances, absent any
specific guidelines, might create more ambiguity and disparity in the resolution of factually similar cases and "unintentionally" expand police power "at the expense of the individual"); Comment, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: The Question of Noncustodial
and Custodial Consent Searches, 66 J. CRiM. L. & C. 286, 305 (1975) (Bustamonte
might "signal . . . an erosion of fourth amendment rights" since, through consent
searches police may avoid the probable cause, sworn affidavit, and particularity requirements mandated by the warrant procedure); Note, The Doctrine of Waiver and
Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891, 906 (1974) (the Bustamonte decision
has rendered the waiver concept "an overinflated word of art"); Note, Schneckloth v.
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opinion, the Burger Court reached an intended result affording courts
wide latitude in which to find searches legal based on consent. The
Burger Court clearly eschewed formulating absolute rules of police
conduct, in contrast to the Warren Court's action in Miranda. Bustamonte also evidences the Court's perceptible shift in support of police activities, with a concomitant decrease in emphasis on individual
rights. Significantly, the "totality of the circumstances" approach,
which Justice Stewart expressly limited to noncustodial situations
in Bustamonte, was soon thereafter applied by the Court in a custody
2 95
case.
Bustamonte: A New Era in Consent Searches?, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 655, 669-70 (1974)
("the result [in Bustamonte] is an unfortunate weighing process which admits of no
logical standard" and undermines the Miranda rationale which requires "explicit
knowledge of [a constitutional] right" prior to effectuating a valid waiver); 7 IND. L.
REV. 592, 600 (1974) (fear expressed that the Court's decision would limit "the protection of the fourth amendment, in the context of consent searches, 'to .. .the knowledgeable' " (quoting from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting))). But see 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 556, 564 (1974) (Court's decision
serves to protect both the individual and society by providing sufficient flexibility to
officials in their law enforcement duties).
295 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). After having received a prior indication from a reliable informant that Watson had stolen credit cards in his possession,
federal officers arrested Watson, without a warrant, during a meeting with the informant.
Watson was given his Miranda warnings and was searched, revealing no incriminating
evidence. Watson then acquiesced to an officer's request to search his car. In the ensuing search, evidence was obtained which resulted in Watson's conviction. Id. at 412-13.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the warrantless arrest had
been illegal and that, under the circumstances of the case, consent had not been freely
given. Id. at 414.
The Supreme Court reversed both findings of the court of appeals. Although it
primarily addressed the issue of the legality of the petitioner's arrest in the absence of
a warrant, the Court stated that custody alone was insufficient to demonstrate that the
petitioner's consent was coerced. Noting that Watson was "not in the confines of the
police station" at the time of the search and that the petitioner had previously been
arrested, suggesting that Watson had some knowledge of his rights, the Court stated that
under the standards established in Bustamonte, there was no indication that the petitioner's consent had not been voluntary. Id. at 424-25.
Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, id. at 433, stated that the
majority had "[w]ithout acknowledgement or analysis" extended the Bustamonte rule
to custodial situations, which had repeatedly been distinguished in that decision. Id. at
434. Justice Marshall urged that the differences between custodial and noncustodial
police contacts had been constitutionally recognized with respect to confessions in
Miranda, and that the Government should similarly be obligated to meet a higher
burden to show voluntariness in custodial consent search cases. He felt that the burden
should include a showing that the suspect was aware of his right to deny consent. Id. at
456-58.
For a thorough examination and discussion of Watson see Note, Warrantless Felony
Arrests Made in Public Are Valid Despite the Existence of Sufficient Time to Obtain a
Warrant; the "Totality of the Circumstances" Test Applies to Consent Searches When
Consent Was Given Subsequent to Arrest, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 891 (1976).
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The Hughes court in State v. Johnson2 96 took a directly contrary
view to the United States Supreme Court, holding that
the validity of a consent to a search, even in a non-custodial situation, must be measured in terms of waiver; i. e., where the State
seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of
showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of
297
which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.
In so holding, the New Jersey supreme court has imposed a greater
burden on the prosecution than had the United States Supreme Court
in Bustamonte. As such, the court could not base its decision on the
federal constitution. 298 The Hughes court, therefore, based its decision on article 1, paragraph 7, of the state constitution-a provision
virtually identical to the fourth amendment. 29 9 Concerned that most
individuals would interpret an official request to search "as having the
force of law," 30 0 the court concluded that
[u]nless it is shown by the State that the person involved knew that
he had the right to refuse to accede to such a request, his assenting
30 1
...is not meaningful.
Six Justices however, refused to require the state to show that a Miranda-type warning had been given. 30 2 Justice Pashman dissented,
29668 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
297 Id. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 68.
298 In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Supreme Court held that "a State
may not impose .. . greater restrictions [on police activity] as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them." Id. at 719
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
299 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 68. The fourth amendment of the federal constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not he violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Article I, paragraph 7, of the New Jersey constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers
and things to be seized.
N.J. CONST. art. I, 7 (emphasis added).
30068 N.J. at 354, 346 A.2d at 68.
301Id.

102See id. at 354 (majority opinion), 354-56 (concurring opinion), 346 A.2d at 68-69.
Although the court did not elaborate upon how the state could satisfy its burden, it cited
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urging that such a warning would not obstruct police procedures and
that the failure to require such a warning
merely pay[s] lip service to the subject's awareness of his rights in
of law enforcement at
an effort to accommodate the convenience 303
the expense of important personal freedoms.
By looking to the state constitution, New Jersey's highest court
has employed a mechanism by which it may effect a judicial philosophy more protective of individual rights than that currently demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court. Reliance on the state
constitution not only enabled the Hughes court to reach an independ30 4
ent judgment regarding the elements of a valid consent search,
but it also served to insulate the court's conclusion from federal review. 3 05 By its action, the court has joined a small but growing number of state courts which have accorded greater individual rights on
the basis of state constitutional provisions.3 0 6 Curiously, the Hughes
Justice Marshall's dissent in Bustamonte., 412 U.S. at 286, for ways in which the police
could demonstrate a person's awareness of his right to consent. 68 N.J. at 354 n.3, 346
A.2d at 68. See note 282 supra.
303 68 N.J. at 368, 346 A.2d at 76.
304 In Johnson, the Hughes court recognized that
Schneckloth is controlling on state courts insofar as construction and application of the Fourth Amendment is concerned and is dispositive of defendant's
federal constitutional argument.
Id. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67. Since the precise question addressed in Johnson had been
resolved in Bustamonte on fourth amendment grounds, the state court was constrained
from interpreting that provision in such a manner as to reach a conclusion not conforming to the Supreme Court's. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963). The ultimate construction of a state constitutional provision, however, rests upon the highest court of the state. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 613 (1937).
305 In the absence of a federal question, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction
to review a state court judgment. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,
380 U.S. 194, 198 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). A state decision
based on state law which accords greater individual rights than those guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment presents no federal question and thus is not subject to federal
review.
306 See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976) (rejecting the impeachment exception to Miranda established in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal.
Rptr. supp. 629 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1976)
(warrantless arrests within one's home are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances-rejecting the trend of United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976)); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. supp. 315
(1975) (rejecting the rule of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), which permits full body searches incident to
a custodial arrest); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(en banc), stay of judgment denied, 405 U.S. 983, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972)
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court was one of the first state courts to assert an independently liberal stance on search and seizure, the precise context in which the
Weintraub court so consistently sought to circumvent the liberal
opinions of the Warren Court.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the search and seizure decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Warren and Burger and of the
New Jersey supreme court under Chief Justices Weintraub and
Hughes indicates that the Weintraub court was predominantly interested in protecting society from criminal attack at a time when the
Warren Court favored the expansion of individual constitutional protections from governmental intrusion. Conversely, as the Burger
Court has de-emphasized concern for individual rights in favor of law
enforcement efficiency, the New Jersey court under Chief Justice
Hughes, in at least one important case, 30 7 has manifested dissatisfac(holding the death penalty unqualifiedly violative of the state constitution) (overruled
by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (adopted Nov. 7, 1972)); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520
P.2d 51 (1974) (rejecting the rule of United States v. Robinson, supra, and Gustafson
v. Florida, supra, which permits full body searches incident to a custodial arrest); State
v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) (rejecting the impeachment exception
to Miranda established in Harris v. New York, supra); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me.
1974) (affording jury trials in all criminal cases and rejecting the "petty offense" exception of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554,
227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975) (forbidding warrantless monitoring
of conversations with informant equipped with concealed electronic transmitting device which is permitted by United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); People v.
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974) (providing right to counsel at time of
corporeal identification prior to indictment and at time of photographic identification
-rejecting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972)); cf. People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973) (rejecting the
subjective predisposition test of United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), in favor
of an objective test for entrapment).
For discussion and commentary on the recent use of state constitutions to accord
greater protection of individual rights see Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45
WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973); Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case
of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 125 (1969); Morris,
New Horizon for a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REV. 474 (1970); Project Report,
Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L.
REV. 271 (1973); Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of Procedural
Rights Beyond Supreme Court Requirements, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 577 (1975); Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974); Comment, The Scope of Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests in California: Rejecting the
Federal Rule, 9 U. SAN FRANCISco L. REV. 317 (1974).
307 State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). For a discussion of Johnson

see notes 296-304 supra and accompanying text.
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tion with a conservative Burger Court result, and has afforded a higher
degree of protection to individual rights.
Since the Burger Court has begun to interpret the Bill of Rights
more narrowly, there has been a flurry of state court opinions imposing stricter limits on state action based on state constitutional provisions. 30 8 State courts have resorted to their own constitutions in these
instances because they may be reversed on certiorari if they employ
federal constitutional analysis which conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent. Such exercises of state constitutional authority, including
the Hughes court decision in State v. Johnson, have been recognized
by the Supreme Court3 0 9 and specifically encouraged by Justice Bren3 11
nan 3 10 and commentators.
The Hughes court has thus far employed the New Jersey constitution in only one search and seizure case in order to circumvent a
conservative opinion of the Burger Court. As such, it is yet too early
to predict the outcome of future cases. The court's action in Johnson
may have been no more than a reaction to what it perceived as a particularly unpersuasive opinion in Bustamonte. At the very minimum,
Johnson indicates that the Hughes court is not reluctant to reject a
federal constitutional standard that it considers inadequate to protect individual rights. Furthermore, it may be expected that the New
Jersey supreme court will continue in its historical pattern of independent analysis of search and seizure issues, enabling the court to
reach results consonant with its own philosophy.
308 See note 306 supra and accompanying text.
309 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (196,7).
310 In a recent address before the New Jersey State Bar Association, Justice Brennan
noted that
more and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of
provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more
protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased. This is
surely an important and highly significant development for our constitutional
jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism.
Brennan, Developments In Constitutional Law, 99 N.J.L.J. 473, 482 (1976). See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("no State is
precluded . . . from adhering to higher standards under state law").
351 See, e.g., Falk, supra note 306, at 285-86; Force, supra note 306, at 141-45; Note,
Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of Procedural Rights Beyond Supreme
Court Requirements, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 577, 586-87 (1975); Note, Rediscovering the
California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481, 511 (1974). For a discussion
of the historical justifications for a state providing greater protection of individual freedoms than the federal government see Project Report, supra note 306, at 277-78; Comment, supra note 306, at 335.

